Controlling Telework: An Exploratory Investigation of Portfolios of Control Applied to Remote Knowledge Workers by Wang, Jijie
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Computer Information Systems Dissertations Department of Computer Information Systems
5-6-2009
Controlling Telework: An Exploratory
Investigation of Portfolios of Control Applied to
Remote Knowledge Workers
Jijie Wang
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cis_diss
Part of the Management Information Systems Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Computer Information Systems at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Computer Information Systems Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wang, Jijie, "Controlling Telework: An Exploratory Investigation of Portfolios of Control Applied to Remote Knowledge Workers."
Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2009.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cis_diss/35
 1
  
 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
Controlling Telework: An Exploratory Investigation of 
Portfolios of Control Applied to Remote Knowledge Workers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jijie Wang 
jwang@cis.gsu.edu 
Department of Computer Information Systems 
J. Mack Robinson College of Business 
Georgia State University 
35 Broad Street 
Atlanta, Georgia, 30303 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
Chair: Dr. Daniel Robey: (CIS) 
Examiners: Dr. Karlene C. Cousins (FIU– CIS) 
Dr. Michael Gallivan (CIS) 
Dr. Balasubramaniam Ramesh (CIS) 
 
 2
Table of Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... 4 
1 Introduction................................................................................................................. 5 
2 Literature Review........................................................................................................ 8 
2.1 The Concept of Control....................................................................................... 8 
2.2 The Cybernetic Model of Control....................................................................... 9 
2.3 Agency Theory.................................................................................................. 10 
2.4 Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans ................................................................... 12 
2.4.1 Three Sources of Controls ......................................................................... 12 
2.4.2 Concertive Control: An Exemplar of Clan Control .................................. 15 
2.4.3 The Rise of Community Governance in the Knowledge Economy.......... 16 
2.5 Self-Control....................................................................................................... 18 
2.5.1 Self-Management ...................................................................................... 18 
2.5.2 Self- leadership .......................................................................................... 21 
2.6 Portfolios of Controls........................................................................................ 22 
2.7 Disciplinary Power and Control........................................................................ 24 
2.8 Dialectic of Control........................................................................................... 25 
2.9 Research on Controls in Information Systems Research.................................. 26 
2.9.1 IS Studies on the Antecedents of Control Modes ..................................... 27 
2.9.2 IS Studies on the Portfolios of Controls ................................................... 28 
2.9.3 IS Studies on the Consequences of Controls ............................................ 31 
2.9.4 IS Studies on Computerized Monitoring Systems .................................... 32 
2.9.5 IS Studies on the Impact of IT on Organizational Controls...................... 34 
2.10 Studies on organizational controls in the context of telework .......................... 36 
2.11 Summary of Literature Review......................................................................... 37 
3 Research Questions ................................................................................................... 38 
4 Research Approach................................................................................................... 40 
4.1 Research Assumptions and Research Paradigm ............................................... 40 
4.2 Research Methodology ..................................................................................... 45 
4.2.1 Grounded Theory...................................................................................... 45 
4.2.2 Research site ............................................................................................. 48 
4.2.3 Data Generation ........................................................................................ 49 
4.2.4 Data Analysis ............................................................................................ 51 
5 Results ....................................................................................................................... 53 
5.1 Social Contexts of the Two Groups .................................................................. 53 
5.2 Organizational Controls within the Two Work Teams ..................................... 56 
5.2.1 Outcome Controls ..................................................................................... 56 
5.2.2 Behavioral Control.................................................................................... 64 
5.2.3 Clan Control.............................................................................................. 70 
5.2.4 Self Control............................................................................................... 75 
5.2.5 Summary of the Results ............................................................................ 77 
6 Discussion................................................................................................................. 80 
6.1 Controls in the Telework Environment............................................................. 80 
6.1.1 Outcome Control....................................................................................... 80 
6.1.2 Behavioral Control.................................................................................... 81 
6.1.3 Clan Control.............................................................................................. 83 
 3
6.1.4 Self Control............................................................................................... 84 
6.1.5 Control Portfolio ....................................................................................... 86 
6.2 The Role of the Use Information Technologies in Organizational controls ..... 89 
7 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 93 
Appendix 1: The list of the starting codes ........................................................................ 97 
Appendix 2: The list of the final codes used in the data analyses .................................. 100 
Reference ........................................................................................................................ 102 
 
 4
Abstract 
Enabled by the development of information technologies, telecommuting and telework 
have been incorporated into organizations for around 30 years. However, there still exists 
resistance to this work arrangement, particularly from middle-level managers. Formal 
knowledge about how to manage telework is needed to keep the managers better 
informed. I conducted a qualitative exploratory study to investigate how managers 
exercise controls in the telework environment and examined the role of the use of 
information technologies in organizational controls in this work environment. Based on 
interview data with people from two work groups that participate in telework program, I 
found that the managers exercise a portfolio of controls that consist all four documented 
control forms (outcome, behavior, clan and self control), and controlling the employees’ 
adoption and use of information technologies is a new form of behavior control in the 
telework environment. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The term “telecommuting” was coined about 30 years ago to refer to the 
phenomenon that employees can access information in the workplace through 
technologies without physically being in the workplace (Nilles 1994). Telework refers to 
work that is done through telecommuting. Enabled by the development of information 
technologies and driven by the knowledge economy and global business competition, 
more and more organizations start to incorporate telework into their organization design. 
According to a WorldatWork group report in 2006, the number of Americans whose 
employer allows them to work from home at least one day per month increased from 7.6 
million in 2004, to 9.9 million in 2005, and to 12.4 million in 2006. The United States 
Bureau of Transportation Services in 2006 showed that 30 percent of the US labor force 
work at home at least part of the week (Mello 2007).  
  Telework brings environmental and societal benefits thanks toreduced 
commuting. In addition, telework brings benefits to both the employers and the 
employees. For the employers, the benefits include increased employee productivity, 
enhanced customer and client service, reduced operation cost, improved resilience to 
unexpected circumstances, and increased recruitment options. For the employees, 
Telework leads to a better quality of life, more flexible work schedules, and reduced 
transportation costs and travel durations (Khaifa and Davidson 2000).  
 Despite the benefits of Telework listed above, there are still challenges to 
implement a successful telework program. There is even resistance to telework from 
many companies (Khaifa and Davidson 2000; Baker, Avery and Crawford 2006). For 
example, in 2006, HP pulled telecommuting IT staff back to offices (Thibodeau 2006). 
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With the development of information technologies, technologies no longer restrict 
Telework, and the major challenge lies on the management side (Baker, Avery et al. 
2006).  
One of the significant challenges to implement a successful telework program lies 
in the management of telework. It is found that some managers are resistant to change 
and hesitant to change managerial practices. Some managers stick to the old management 
practices of managing by walking around (Mears 2007) and still have the traditional 
managerial attitude that workers need to be seen to be considered working (Lupton and 
Haynes 2000).  
The hesitance and suspicion of telework in practitioners is affected by the lack of 
formal knowledge about managerial controls in telework (Jessup and Robey 2002). The 
following questions remain unanswered. When the cost of physically monitoring mobile 
and distributed workforce becomes high, how will management adapt their controls? Will 
management simply rely on output control rather than evaluate work behaviors and 
presence? Will management evaluate work based on the digital trace of the work created 
by information technologies? Will management engage in compulsive monitoring with 
the help of anytime/anywhere access? Or will managers encourage and facilitate 
employees to engage in self-control behaviors? Answers to these questions are of great 
practical value to management in organizations implementing telework programs.  
Besides practical implications, answers to the above questions are of great value 
to advancing our understanding of theories of organizational controls, which very likely 
need to be changed or adapted for the telework environment. Telework loosens the spatial 
and temporal constraints of work, separates managers and employees to some degree, and 
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redefines the notion of “work” and “workplace”. Traditional control theories may not 
directly apply, and thus need to be re-evaluated, elaborated and updated.  
Moreover, Orlikowski and Barley (2001) comment that literatures on 
telecommuting either focus on organizational and institutional issues of telecommuting 
but neglect technology advancement, or emphasize innovation enabling information 
technologies but ignore organizational issues. They call for more research on the issue of 
telecommuting to incorporate both organization theory and the use of information 
technologies. Prior studies have shown that the adoption and use of information 
technologies can have impact on organizational controls (Orlikowski 1991). In telework, 
using information technologies is an essential part of work because the employees rely on 
these technologies to work and communicate. Therefore, it is worthwhile to explore the 
relationship between information technology use and organizational controls. Will the 
employers control the employees’ use of technologies? Will using technologies become 
part of the control process? We intend to answer these questions in this research.  
In summary, telework has become increasingly popular in today’s organizations. 
In order for the telework program to benefit both the employers and the employees, 
managers of teleworking employees need to implement effective organizational controls. 
Traditional organizational theories do not directly apply because telework changes the 
organizational environment. Therefore, we plan to conduct a study to explore the control 
issues in telework. Specially, we intend to answer the following two questions: 
1) How do organizational controls operate in the telework environment?  
2) What is the relationship between organizational controls and the use of 
information technologies in the telework environment?  
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In order to answer these two research questions, I conducted a qualitative empirical 
study and develop a theoretical account about the organizational controls in telework to 
further elaborate and extend organizational control theories.  
2 Literature Review 
 Because the focus of the study is organizational controls in telework 
environments, I draw on control theories in organization studies as our theoretical basis. I 
discuss the concept of control; review three dominant theoretical views about control; 
discuss self-control as an alternative control method; summarize the recent development 
in control theory regarding control portfolios; and review the research in information 
systems on controls. Moreover, I describe two critical perspectives on controls, 
disciplinary power and the dialectic of control.   
2.1 The Concept of Control 
Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary defines that “to control” means “to exercise 
restraining or directing influence over: regulate.” In organization studies, theories on 
controls are studied from classical, modern, symbolic-interpretive, and postmodern 
perspectives (Hatch 1997). In the organization theory, organizational control has been 
interpreted in various ways. The dominant view is from Tannenbaum, who regarded 
control as the sum of interpersonal influence relations in an organization (Tannenbaum 
1968). He stated:  
“Organization implies control. A social organization is an ordered arrangement of 
individual human interactions. Control processes help circumscribe idiosyncratic 
behaviors and keep them conformant to the rational plan of the organization. 
Organizations require a certain amount of conformity as well as the integration of 
diverse activities. It is the function of control to bring about conformance to 
organization requirements and achievement of the ultimate purpose of the 
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organization. The coordination and order out of the diverse interests and 
potentially diffuse behaviors of members is largely a function of control.” 
(Tannenbaum 1968, page 3) 
 
The basic assumption underlying control theory is that individuals participating in 
an organization have divergent interests and goals. It is likely that these divergent 
interests and goals are incongruent with the organization’s goal. Therefore, in order to 
ensure that organizational members work dependably, organizations need to implement 
controls to direct individual efforts to meet the organization’s goal (Ouchi 1979; Ouchi 
1980). Control can be applied to different levels, such as individuals and groups.  
2.2 The Cybernetic Model of Control 
One way to conceptualize a control system is to perceive it as a cybernetic system 
(Beer 1959; Green and Welsh 1988). In cybernetics, the current state of a system is 
compared against the desired state, and an adjustment is made if any discrepancy between 
the two is detected. For example, a thermostat is designed to compare the current room 
temperature with the desired temperature and turn the heating/cooling unit on or off 
depending on the difference between the current and desired temperatures (Hatch 1997).  
In a cybernetic control system, organizations first set up targets or standards of 
acceptable behaviors and/or outputs according to organizational goals. Then 
organizations monitor work tasks conducted by employees. Organizations evaluate 
behaviors and/or outputs of employees based on the target or standard, and then provide 
feedback to employees. If an employee’s behavior or output deviates from the standards, 
the organization will take the corrective measure to adjust the employees’ actions. 
Sometimes if the deviation is due to unfair standards, the organization will also revise the 
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standards. The focus of the control system is performance evaluation and feedback 
systems on work tasks (Robey and Sales 1994; Hatch 1997).  
According to the contents of the target or standard, the control system can be 
categorized as output or behavior control. These two types of controls are often 
categorized as formal controls (Kirsh 1996). Output control focuses on the result of task 
activity and relies on the measurement of task output. In organizations using output 
control, output needs to have high measurability and should be easily associated with 
either individuals or groups (Ouchi 1979; Hatch 1997). When these two conditions do not 
apply, organizations can use behavior control, in which behaviors that are associated with 
high performance are identified and established as targets or standards. In organizations 
using behavior control, the task observablility needs to be high, meaning that the process 
of transforming from input to output needs to be well-understood by organizations (Ouchi 
1979; Hatch 1997; Turner and Makhija 2006). When both output measurability and task 
observability are low, organizations will have difficulty with both behavior and outcome 
controls (Hatch 1997). One typical case is creative and innovative work, in which output 
is too unique to make comparisons to a standard, and the behaviors rendering good 
performance are hard to define (Robey and Sales 1994). 
2.3 Agency Theory 
 Agency theory conceptualizes the control problem around the relationship 
between organization’s owners (called principals), and managers (called agents). 
Managers are perceived as agents because they are expected to act in the principals’ 
interests rather than their own when making decisions on behalf of the principal. An 
agency problem refers to the risk that managers will serve their own interest rather than 
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their principal’s. Agency theories focus on ways to control the agents’ self-serving 
behaviors and assure the interests of the principals (Ross 1973). Although agency 
theorists form their theories in terms of the relationships between organizations’ owners 
and top management, the theory can be generalized to lower levels of management and 
their subordinates (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Eisenhardt 1985).   
 In agency theory, contracts are used to align the agents’ self-interests with the 
interests of their principals (Eisenhardt 1985; Hatch 1997). Contracts specify measures 
and promise rewards so that agents’ own interests are served when they fulfill the 
demands of the contracts. Through the contract, principals delegate work to their agents 
for an agreed price, and their divergent interests are aligned. When principals are not or 
cannot be continuously present, they are open to opportunism by agents who may not 
perform as agreed, that is, they may shirk (Hatch 1997).  
 In agency theory, principals rely on information to know whether their agents are 
shirking. Complete information means that the principals know exactly whether the 
agents are performing to the specification of the contract, while incomplete information 
means that they do not know exactly. If the principals’ information is incomplete, agents 
may have temptation to shirk. Although direct observation can provide complete 
information, it takes time and effort and principals cannot do so because the monitoring 
costs are too high. To deal with incomplete information situations, the principals have 
two options. They can either purchase surveillance mechanisms, or they can reward their 
agents based on outcomes instead of behaviors (Eisenhardt 1985; Hatch 1997).  
 From the perspective of agency theory, the issue of whether to use behavior or 
outcome control is a matter of the costs associated with collecting the information 
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required to minimize the chance that the agents will shirk (Eisenhardt 1985; Hatch 1997). 
Behavior controls require surveillance mechanisms and information systems. When tasks 
are non-routine, such mechanisms and systems are difficult to build. Output control is 
less costly if the output can be easily measured. Since outcome not only depends on the 
agents’ behaviors but also depends on the conditions in the environment. When agents 
are under outcome control, they share the uncontrollable risk with the principals (Hatch 
1997).  
2.4 Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans 
2.4.1 Three Sources of Controls  
Ouchi (1979; 1980) conceptualizes three distinguishable sources of control 
mechanisms: markets, bureaucracies and clans. Organizations that implement market 
control use price competition as a control mechanism. Profit centers are created within a 
multi-divisional organization, and outputs from one subdivision are transferred to the 
next based on internal “transfer price” (Hatch 1997). Organizations that implement 
bureaucracy control rely on rules, procedures, documentations, and surveillance as 
control. They make rules about either the standards of task process or the quantity and 
quality of the task output, and provide supervisors authority to exercise close personal 
surveillance and direction over subordinates. Organizations that implement clan 
mechanisms facilitate their employees to obtain high internal commitment to the firm’s 
objective, cultures, norms, and values mainly through the employee selection, promotion, 
and socialization processes. In clan control, explicit surveillance and evaluations can be 
removed because employees internalize the organization’s goal. Socialization between 
organization members is essential in the internalization process. Ouchi (1979; 1980) 
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observes that all organizations exercise a combination of the three control strategies, but 
each organization favors one strategy over the other two.  
Ouchi (1979) discusses the social and informational requirements for the three 
sources of controls. The social requirement for market control is the norm of reciprocity, 
meaning that both parties involved in a transaction should be honest with each other and 
understand that cheating behaviors will lead to severe punishment. Without the norm of 
reciprocity, cheating behaviors will elevate the cost of transactions and eventually lead to 
market failure. The social requirement for bureaucratic control includes legitimate 
authority in addition to the norm of reciprocity. Under bureaucratic control, employees 
work in exchange for salary as those under market control. Furthermore, they also agree 
to give up part of their autonomy and legitimately allow their supervisors to monitor and 
direct their work activities. Clan control has the strictest social requirements. It not only 
requires the norm of reciprocity and legitimate authority, but also requires agreement on 
values and beliefs.  In clan control, there are no explicit price mechanisms or explicit 
rules and procedures. It requires an implicit  agreement about the proper behaviors and 
high level commitment to those socially prescribed behaviors.  
Among the three controls, clan control is the most demanding and market control 
is the least demanding in terms of the social requirements. However, the opposite is true 
in terms of the informational requirements. In market control, internal transfer prices 
need to be provided to support the transactions between departments within a single 
organization. Explicit information systems such as accounting information systems and 
other implicit information systems are demanded to provide the transfer prices 
information. In reality, because of technological interdependence and uncertainty, 
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arriving at a transfer price is not always feasible. Thus organizations will implement 
bureaucratic control, creating explicit sets of rules to establish standards about behaviors 
and output.  Organizations implementing bureaucratic control need to create rules and 
communicate these rules to their employees, and they need information systems to 
monitor, evaluate and provide feedback to employees. In clan control, information is 
contained in the rituals, stories, and ceremonies, and it does not require a large staff of 
accounting and information systems experts to create and maintain complex information 
systems for the purpose of control. However, the information about values and norms is 
subtle, meaning that it cannot be easily obtained by newcomers. Therefore, socialization 
between employees is essential in clan control.  
Ouchi (1979) outlines the relationship between forms of commitment and the 
three types of control. He points out that the commitment levels are high for both market 
and clan control. Under market control, employees internalize that they work toward their 
self-interests; under clan control, employees internalize the organizational goals and are 
even willing to sacrifice their self-interests. The employee commitment level is low under 
bureaucratic control. Employees can accept their supervisors’ monitoring, direction and 
advice without internalization. In other words, compliance is the minimum commitment 
level required. However, a control heavily depending on explicit monitoring, evaluation, 
and feedback  has the risk of offending people’s sense of autonomy and of self-control. 
Costs involved in the three different types of controls vary. Market control carries 
low cost for searching and selecting employees and low cost of monitoring and 
surveillance. Market control works well when people work for their self-interest, so the 
requirements for selecting employees do not have to be very restrictive. There is little 
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monitoring and surveillance so the cost is low. However, market control bears high cost 
of information system in order to provide transfer price information. In bureaucratic 
control, the cost of searching for and selecting people is low. Once people get employed, 
they receive intensive training and monitoring and direction from their supervisors. 
However, the cost of developing and running a supervisory system to monitor, evaluate, 
and correct people behaviors is high. In clan control, it is critical to select the right people 
into the organization, so it bears high cost of searching for and selecting people as well as 
socializing people. Because clan control depends on people’s willingness to conform to 
organization goals rather than on explicit monitoring and surveillance system, the cost of 
bureaucracy is low while the cost of facilitating people’s internalization of organization’s 
objectives, culture, and beliefs is high. 
2.4.2 Concertive Control: An Exemplar of Clan Control 
 One exemplar of clan control is concertive control in self-managing teams. 
Concertive control refers to notion that workers control themselves by collaborating to 
develop their own control (Tompskins and Cheney 1985; Barker 1993). In the process of 
establishing and exercising concertive control, first workers interact and reach a 
negotiated consensus about proper behaviors. They do so by internalizing a set of core 
values of their organizations, such as those found in their corporate vision. Subsequently, 
this negotiated consensus produces and reproduces value-based discourse among 
workers, and normative rules emerge. Next, workers within a work team follow these 
rationalized normative rules to reward proper behaviors and sanction inappropriate ones. 
Thus, workers behave within the parameters of the value systems and the discourse that 
they generate (Barker 1993).  
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 The key difference between concertive control and bureaucratic control is the 
locus of the authority - the legitimate source of control. Under a bureaucratic system, 
rational rules are created and maintained by supervisors. Under concertive control, they 
come from the value consensus of the group’s or the organization’s members (Barker 
1993). The successful implementation of concertive control requires a high level of 
collaboration and high degree of self-management. This form of control is probably less 
apparent but more powerful because every team member, not just the supervisor, can 
assume the controller’s role.   
2.4.3 The Rise of Community Governance in the Knowledge Economy 
 Adler (2001) argues that recent conceptualization of trends in organization forms 
overemphasizes the importance of markets, hierarchies, and hybrid intermediate forms of 
these two, while ignoring a third type of organization and its coordination mechanism – 
the community form of organization with trust as coordination mechanism. Different 
institutions combine the three organization forms/coordination mechanisms in different 
proportions. Furthermore, he argues that as the economy becomes more knowledge 
intensive, it is expected that high-trust institutional forms will proliferate and be more 
effective than market and hierarchy forms of organizations.  
The community form of organization is an informal organization that constitutes 
its members as a community. In community organizations, trust is the key coordinating 
mechanism. In short, trust is confidence in another’s goodwill. Moreover, Adler argues 
that the most effective form of trust is reflective trust rather than traditionalistic, “blind” 
trust. With three types of coordination mechanisms, market/price, bureaucracy/hierarchy, 
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and community/trust, institutions can be mapped in three dimensions according to their 
salience of the different coordination mechanisms. 
In addition, Adler (2001) hypothesizes that as our economy grows more 
knowledge-intensive, community/trust becomes a more effective means of organizational 
governance than market/price and bureaucracy/hierarchy. In today’s economy, as the 
educational level of the workforce rises and the scientific and technical knowledge 
represented in equipment and products grows, knowledge creation and dissemination 
become critical activities within and across organizations.  
The “public good” nature of knowledge determines that market/price and 
bureaucracy/hierarchy are not as effective as community/trust. In the market form of 
organization, price mechanism is used to optimize the production and allocation of 
products; however, it does not work well with knowledge.  As a public good, knowledge 
does not diminish and cease to be available to others after it is consumed by one 
consumer. Reliance on market/price mode creates a trade-off between production and 
allocation of knowledge. On one hand, establishing strong intellectual property rights can 
optimize the production of knowledge by creating incentive of knowledge generation. 
However, the cost of maintaining such rights is high and blocks wide access to the 
knowledge, which ironically limits the successful allocation of knowledge resources 
(Adler 2001).  
In the hierarchy form of organization, authority is the primary coordinating 
mechanism. Under hierarchy, knowledge is often treated as a scarce resource and 
therefore located along with decision rights in either specialized functional units or at 
higher organizational levels. Such an institutional structure may work efficiently when 
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dealing with routine tasks, but is inefficient for non-routine innovative tasks. Even if 
authority mandates the free availability of knowledge and solves the knowledge 
allocation problem, it cannot create the incentive to create knowledge (Adler 2001) . 
Community/trust is a more efficient mechanism when facilitating knowledge-
intensive activities, because trust can both reduce transaction costs by replacing contracts 
with handshakes and reduce agency risks by replacing fear of shirking and 
misrepresentation with mutual confidence (Adler 2001). Therefore, trust mitigates the 
coordination difficulty created by the characteristics of knowledge as a public good. As 
knowledge management becomes increasingly important in today’s organizations, trust 
becomes increasingly attractive as a coordination mechanism.  
2.5 Self-Control 
 In addition to three sources of control initiated from the organization, employee 
self-control can be seen as a fourth form of control.  In this section, I review literatures 
about self-management and self-leadership. The former concept is often used 
interchangeably with “self-control”, while the later concept includes “self-control” but 
also goes beyond it. 
2.5.1 Self-Management 
Self-management in organizational contexts refers to the phenomenon that a 
person behaves in a way congruent with organizational goals without being subject to 
external controls. In self-management, individual employees set up standards and then 
monitor, evaluate and reward their own behaviors. The evaluation standards in self-
management can come from past performance, the observed performance of others, and 
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socially acquired performance criteria (Mahoney 1974). In a work environment, 
supervisors often cannot control all the factors influencing employees’ behaviors. If 
employees can specify contingencies to influence their own behaviors, these self-
influenced behaviors can be a substitute for formal leadership (Manz and Sims Jr 1980).  
The consequences resulting from self-management have two levels: those directly 
involved in the self-controlling process, and those resulting from the outcome of self-
controlling behaviors. All people exercise self-control sometimes. Self-management 
occurs in many situations, even when external controls are strong (Mills 1983). Thoresen 
and Mahoney (1974) conclude that most successful self-control methods typically 
involve some interaction with external control.  
The benefits of self-management to employees are to avoid “over attribution” 
(Manz and Sims Jr 1980). Over attribution is the tendency that people explain others’ 
behaviors by internal personal dispositions, while explaining their own behavior in terms 
of external situations (Jones 1976). When employees take responsibility for their own 
behaviors, observer bias can be limited. Self-management is a cost-effective management 
method for organizations. However, organizations need to direct self-management 
behaviors to avoid dysfunctional self-management.  
There are two major self-management strategies: environmental planning, 
referring to changing factors in the environment so that positive behaviors are more likely 
to occur, and behavioral programming, referring to rewarding or correcting oneself based 
on performance (Manz and Sims Jr 1980). Five procedures to implement these two 
strategies are: 1) self-observation: systematic data gathering about one’s own behavior in 
order to establish the basis for self-evaluation; 2) specifying goals, especially publicly; 3) 
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cueing strategies - limiting environmental factors that lead to undesirable behavior while 
increasing those evoking desirable behavior, 4) incentive modification - self-reward and 
self-punishment, and 5) rehearsal - systematic practice of a desired performance (Manz 
and Sims Jr 1980).  
Organization managers/leaders can help their subordinates to engage in self-
management behavior. Leaders should be role models in this process, and their strategies 
change as .the subordinates become more capable of self-management during the process. 
At the beginning, leaders reinforce behaviors that lead to good performance, and then 
they gradually shift to reinforce the strategies or processes of self-management such as 
goal setting and self-reinforcement (Manz and Sims Jr 1980). 
 Several factors can affect the appropriateness of using self-management, 
including nature of the task, nature of the problem, the availability of time, and the 
importance of subordinate development (Manz and Sims Jr 1980). It is more suitable to 
use self-management when the nature of the task is creative, analytical, or intellectual in 
nature. Self-management is appropriate when organizations are solving unstructured 
problems; the information needed to solve the problems comes from subordinates; the 
solutions to the problems must be accepted by subordinates to ensure implementation; 
and subordinates internalize organizational goals (Manz and Sims Jr 1980). The 
availability of time is an important factor that determines the importance of subordinate 
self-management. In short-term efficiency mode, self-management is de-emphasized, 
while in development mode, self-management is emphasized as an investment in the 
future. 
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Self-management is appropriate for situations in which organizations cannot 
adequately measure the behavioral performance or standardize the work process  (Mills 
1983). In these situations the behavioral and outcome controls are not feasible. For 
example, when the tasks conducted by employees involve interactions with 
customer/client, employees are likely to confront unexpected, unfamiliar, and novel 
events because the reciprocal transactions between the client and the employee generate 
an environment with high uncertainty (Mills 1983). 
2.5.2 Self-leadership 
Manz (1980) argues that self-influence is the ultimate system of control in 
organizations and proposes a broader view of self-leadership. First, he argues that the 
self-control system can be regarded as the focal point in organizational control systems. 
All organizations exercise external control, either by implementing formal controls such 
as behavior or outcome control, or by influencing employees with informal clan control. 
Meanwhile, each employee possesses his/her own self-control system, which functions 
similar to organizational formal control systems, and has his/her own natural motivations, 
beliefs, and values, which are similar to components in clan control. Organizational 
control systems influence people but they do not directly determine people’s actions. 
Ultimately, “the impact of organizational control mechanisms is determined by the way 
they influence, in intended as well as unintended ways,  the self-control systems within 
organization members” (Manz, 1986, p 586). In this sense, self-control is tightly 
integrated into organizational control systems and can be regarded as the focal point of 
organizational control. 
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Second, Manz (1986) proposes an expanded self-leadership view. This view not 
only includes self-imposed strategies for managing tasks lacking intrinsic motivation but 
also includes self-influence processes that capitalize on the intrinsic motivational value of 
task activities. He further clarifies three interrelated concepts about self-control. The 
concept of self-regulation refers to the cybernetic control process conducted by 
employees to manage their own behaviors. The concept of self-management focuses on 
the strategies to facilitate one’s own behaviors to meet standards. Self-leadership 
represents a broader view, which includes self-management strategies, but also goes 
beyond a behavioral focus to address how appropriate or how desirable the standards are 
themselves.  
 Self-leadership recognizes the importance of intrinsic motivations, the rewards 
that result from performing the activities themselves Manz (1986). Three important 
motivation factors include feelings of competence, self-control and purpose. Several 
strategies can be used to address these three intrinsic motivational aspects: 1) allowing 
employees to choose their own work contexts or environments, 2) building natural 
rewards into the process of performing a task, and 3) encouraging employees to 
psychologically focus on the  pleasant aspects of the work.  
2.6 Portfolios of Controls  
Storey (1985) suggests that control usually works in levels and cycles, so that if 
one level of control fails in an organization, then other forms will assume dominance. 
The same ideas have been developed by more recent studies on organizational controls, 
which suggest that a portfolio of controls that combines different forms of control works 
more effectively than just a single form of control. 
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Adler (2001) agrees with Ouchi (1979; 1980) that there exist three combinations 
of organization forms and controls, which are market/price, hierarchy/authority, and 
community/trust. However, he disagrees with Ouchi that each organization only favors 
one type of control. He argues that different institutions combine the three 
forms/mechanisms in different proportions. More importantly, he proposes that as the 
economy becomes increasingly knowledge intensive, there is a trend toward greater 
reliance on trust rather than the other two types of controls.  
Cardinal, Sitkin et al. (2004) examine the creation and evolution of organizational 
control during organizational founding process. They show how organizational controls 
are created and evolve through specific phases of the founding period, and provide data 
and insights about what drives shifts in the use of various types of controls. Among other 
contributions, they define the balance of controls as a harmonious use of multiple forms 
of control, and find that an imbalance among formal and informal controls is the key 
driver of shifts in control configurations. This study shows that informal and formal 
controls need to co-exist to create effective control portfolios that lead to good 
organization performance.  
 In addition, studies that investigate control issues in IT development projects have 
explored the idea of the portfolio of controls in depth.  These studies will be reviewed in 
the section 3.9.2.  
 After reviewing the dominant views on controls and the recent development on 
control theory, the following two sections turn to two other perspectives on controls: 
disciplinary power and the dialectic of control.   
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2.7 Disciplinary Power and Control 
 Foucault (1979) uses the term “disciplinary power” to refer to the notion that 
individuals and groups often discipline themselves unconsciously even without visible 
external control present at the moment. Under disciplinary power, conformance to control 
is not obtained by physically and personally exercising power over the ones being 
controlled. Instead, social actors interpret that they should be subject to control and 
choose to behave properly even if alternative courses of action might relieve their 
oppression (Robey and Boudreau 1999). 
 One of the key characteristics of power and control under disciplinary power is 
their invisibility. In this situation, controls are exercised indirectly and impersonally. The 
controls might be excised through institutional, technical, or normative regulations, and 
an example can be people who are forced to follow the work procedures embedded 
within an information technology tool that they have to use (Orlikowski 1991). Foucault 
(1979) explains that, traditionally, power and controls were often very visible, and those 
who were controlled were less visible. The ones who were controlled “received light only 
from that portion of power that was conceded to them or from the reflection of it that for 
a moment they carried” (Foucault, 1979, p187). In this sentence, Foucault used a 
metaphor to describe the visibility/invisibility of the power. The power is like the light 
from a lighthouse, and those being controlled are in the dark most of the time and they 
are only visible at the moments that the power is exercised on them. However, 
disciplinary power is the opposite. It “is exercised through its invisibility; at the same 
time it imposed on those whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility.”  
Disciplinary power makes those who are controlled very visible, assuring that power can 
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be exercised on them. “It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to be 
seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection” (Foucault, 1979, p187). 
2.8 Dialectic of Control 
 Based on the central notion from structuration theory that a human agent has the 
capability to choose to act in alternative ways, Giddens (1979; 1984) uses the term 
“dialectic of control” to describe the intrinsic relationship between agency and power. 
Giddens argues that power relations are always two-way.  
“However subordinate an actor may be in a social relationship, the very fact of 
involvement in that relationship gives him or her certain amount of power over 
the other. Those in subordinate positions in social systems are frequently adept at 
converting whatever resources they possess into some degree of control over the 
conditions of reproduction of those social systems.” (Giddens 1979, p 6) 
  
Giddens explains the notion of dialectic of control in the context of critiquing Max 
Weber’s conception of bureaucracy, although he believes that the notion has a broader 
scope. Giddens primarily focuses on two elements of Weber’s conception: the hierarchy 
of offices, and the significance of bureaucratic rules. 
 First, Weber suggests that both authority and power in bureaucracies become 
‘drained off’ towards the top. Bureaucracy causes a progressive decline in autonomy in 
the lower levels of the hierarchy. Giddens critiques that in modern bureaucratic systems, 
there is much space for those assuming subordinate roles to acquire or regain control over 
their organizational tasks than Weber recognizes. “The more tightly-knit and inflexible 
the formal relations of authority within an organization, in fact, the more the possible 
openings for circumventing them” (Giddens 1979, p145). Giddens also argues that the 
formal authority relations within bureaucracies are not consensually accepted through all 
levels of the organization. Instead, these dominant symbol-systems are usually accepted 
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predominantly by those in the higher authority position. Those in the subordinate 
positions still have autonomy and can maintain the element of control by resisting or 
distancing themselves from oppressive tasks, which represents an extension of control.   
 Second, Giddens argues that although the written rules exist within bureaucratic 
organizations as an important component, the rules do not follow or interpret themselves, 
and often do not provide much more of a focus for conflict than Weber acknowledges. 
Written rules, however strictly designed, often leave spaces for human agents to choose 
to do otherwise. When agents act following written rules, their actions are enabled and 
restrained by rules, and at the same time, their actions produce and reproduce those rules.  
Therefore, Giddens stressed,  
 “The dialectic of control operates even in highly repressive forms of 
 collectivity or organization. For it is my argument that the dialect of control is 
 built in to the very nature of agency, or more correctly put, the relation of 
 autonomy and dependence, which agents reproduce in the context of the 
 enactment of definite practices. An agent who does not participate in the dialectic 
 of control, in a minimal fashion, ceases to be an agent.” (Giddens 1979, p149) 
2.9 Research on Controls in Information Systems Research 
 Information system researchers conduct research on the control issues in the 
context of information systems. Much empirical research has been conducted in the 
context of information systems development (ISD) projects to extend and elaborate 
control theories. This branch of research contributes to the control theories from various 
perspectives, including the antecedents of control modes, the portfolios of controls, and 
the consequences of controls. In addition, information system researchers have explored 
the impact of information technologies on organizational controls and the development, 
use and impact of computerized monitoring systems. 
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2.9.1 IS Studies on the Antecedents of Control Modes 
 Kirsch (1996) identifies the antecedent conditions that predict the type of controls 
used in the context of information system development projects. Based on prior 
theoretical and empirical work on control theory, Kirsch (1996) summarizes four types of 
controls (behavior, outcome, clan, and self control), and integrates different theoretical 
perspectives to predict the circumstances under which each type of control will be 
implemented. While acknowledging that the characteristics of the task and the 
organizational environment predict the use of various types of control as indicated in 
prior studies, Kirsch (1996) also argues that control theory is incomplete when applied to 
a complex, non-routine task such as the management of information systems 
development. In particular, she proposes that the controller’s knowledge of the 
transformation process of the task is also a key determinant of the type of control chosen. 
Using data collected from survey responses from 96 participants in 32 system 
development efforts, Kirsch concludes that (1) behavior observablility, controllers’ (in 
this case, the project sponsor) knowledge about ISD process, and the interaction factor of 
the two determine the amount of behavior control; (2) the use of outcome control is 
determined by behavior observability and outcome measurability; and (3) the use of self-
control depends on outcome measurability and controllers’ knowledge about ISD. No 
relationship between clan controls and the independent variables was found in this study.  
 Most of the previous studies investigate the choice of different control modes on 
direct reporting relationships between ISD project leaders and their superiors in a 
hierarchical setting. By contrast, Kirsch, Sambamurthy et al. (2002) examine the choice 
of control modes in the client-IS relationships, which involve both hierarchical and lateral 
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settings. Based on data gathered from a survey of 69 pairs of clients and IS project 
leaders, this study re-affirms the antecedent conditions for the use of outcome and 
behavior controls and provides additional empirical evidence for the use of self and clan 
controls. The results suggest that the clients encourage IS project leaders to exercise self 
control when task observability is low and outcome measurability is high, and that clients 
implement clan control when behavior observability is high and clients have little 
knowledge of the ISD process. Consistent with Kirsch (1996), understanding of the ISD 
process is a key factor in controllers’ (in this case, the clients) choice of control modes. 
2.9.2 IS Studies on the Portfolios of Controls 
 
The idea of portfolios of controls have been investigated by IS researchers in the 
context of IT project management. Henderson and Lee (1992) examine the relationship 
between controls and team performance in IS design teams. They argue that controls in 
IS design teams can be initiated by either team managers or project team members. 
Managers influence the performance of the team by either behavior control or outcome 
control, while team members also exercise control in the form of self-control or outcome 
control. In addition, the authors argue for the combined effects of both managerial control 
and team-control based on the work of Tannebaum (1968), which proposes that both 
managerial controls and team-member control can operate concurrently and that their 
effects are additive. The high degree of managerial control can ensure efficient 
administration and the high degree of team-member control can foster identification, 
motivation, and loyalty. Based on empirical data collected from 41 IS design teams, 
Henderson and Lee (1992) conclude that the combination of managerial control and 
 29
team-member control contributes to high team performance, especially when behavior 
control from management and outcome control from team members are combined.  
 Kirsch (1997) examines how and why control portfolios vary in the context of IT 
development projects. Conducting case studies of four IT development projects, she 
explores how IS and user stakeholders exercise control to manage ISD projects and why 
they choose to structure portfolios of control modes as they do. The findings show that 
both users and IS play a critical role in controlling systems development projects, and 
that all stakeholders implement a portfolio of control modes that typically includes both 
formal (outcome and behavior) and informal (clan and self) controls. For each control 
mode, a variety of mixed and overlapping control mechanisms are implemented. When 
stakeholders construct the control portfolios, they typically start with pre-existing 
mechanisms of formal controls, and then design new control mechanisms to implement 
formal control or add informal controls to supplement formal controls. Consistent with 
prior studies on antecedents of selecting control modes in ISD projects (Kirsch 1996), 
this study confirms that the choice of particular control mechanisms depends on task 
characteristics, role expectations (meaning that organization members in certain roles are 
expected to behave in certain patterns), and project-related knowledge and skills.  
Following the work of Kirsch (1997), Choudhury and Sahberwal (2003) explore 
the control portfolios in outsourced ISD projects. Similar to Kirsch (1997), they examine 
mechanisms in the portfolios of controls, the change of the portfolios of controls during 
projects, and factors influencing the change of the portfolios. The difference is that they 
focus on the outsourced rather than in-house projects. They found that the portfolios of 
control in outsourced ISD projects have similarities with and differences from those in 
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traditional ISD projects. Both types of projects are managed by a portfolio of controls. 
However, outcome controls dominate outsourced projects, especially in the initial stage 
of the projects. Behavior controls and mechanisms that encourage and enable vendors’ 
self-control are often added in the later stage of projects. Clan controls are less used -- 
only in situations when the client and vendor have shared goals and when frequent 
interactions lead to shared values. In general, the outsourced projects tend to start with 
simple controls but add additional controls after experiencing performance problems. The 
factors influencing choice of a set of controls are similar to those in the traditional ISD 
projects. The three most important influencing factors at the start of the project are the 
client's perception of the vendor’s knowledge of the project, the consequent role 
expectations, and perceptions of difficulty in monitoring vendor behavior. These factors 
outweigh the potential influence of the controller's project-related knowledge and project 
size. The vendor’s performance in the early stage of project significantly influences the 
construction of control portfolios in the later stage of the project. 
 Kirsch (2004) takes a process view of control portfolios in ISD projects. She 
examines how stakeholders exercise controls during different phases of large IS projects 
and why control choices change across project phases. The findings show that during the 
initial phase of a project, control is exercised as "collective sense-making," in which both 
IS and business stakeholders utilize mostly informal mechanisms of control. During the 
development phase, IS managers structure hierarchical relationships with subordinates 
and rely extensively on formal control mechanisms. Kirsch labels this phase as “technical 
winnowing". During the implementation phase, both IS and business stakeholders 
employ formal and informal mechanisms to exercise control as "collaborative 
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coordinating". This study also finds that the factors triggering the changes in control 
choices from one phase to another lie in the project, stakeholder, and global contexts. As 
factors change across phases, so too do control choices.  
2.9.3 IS Studies on the Consequences of Controls 
 Nidumolu and Subramani (2003) examine the relationships between the modes of 
control used in ISD projects and the projects’ performance. They differentiate controls 
along two dimensions: the process approach and the structure approach. They refer to 
behavior controls (specifying methods) and outcome controls (specifying performance 
criteria) as the process approach, and refer to control through standardization (centrally 
devised standards for activities) and decentralization (delegation of authority for decision 
making) as the structure approach. This study synthesizes these two approaches and 
suggests four control modes: standardization of methods, standardization of performance 
criteria, decentralization of methods, and decentralization of performance criteria. By 
associating these four control modes with projects’ performance in a sample of 56 firms 
in the software industry, the authors find that two control modes, standardization of 
performance criteria and decentralization of methods lead to better project performance, 
that is, performance criteria should be uniform across projects while project teams should 
have the autonomy to choose their own methods. The other two control modes, 
standardization of methods and decentralization of performance criteria are not related to 
project performance.  
 Piccoli and Ives (2003) examine the relationship between behavior control and 
trust in the context of virtual teams. Behavior control has been found effective in 
stimulating team performance, fostering cooperation, and improving individual 
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psychosocial outcomes in traditional co-located teams (Henderson and Lee 1992; Pinto, 
Pinto and Prescott 1993). However, its effect in virtual teams was unknown before this 
study. Piccoli and Ives (2003) propose and confirm through their empirical study that the 
behavior control mechanisms have a significant negative effect on trust in temporary 
virtual teams, where trust can emerge quickly and deteriorate rapidly. Through in-depth 
analysis, they find that decline of trust in virtual teams is rooted in instances of reneging 
and incongruence. Reneging means that a team member knowingly fails to fill her 
obligations, and incongruence means that a team member’s perception of her own 
obligation differs from her team mate’s. Mechanisms of behavior control, such as 
definition of explicit work assignment, specification of rules and procedures, and the 
filing of project plans and project reports, makes reneging and incongruence more easily 
detected by the team and thus appears more salient, leading to trust decline in virtual 
teams.  
2.9.4 IS Studies on Computerized Monitoring Systems 
 Computer-based monitoring is the practice of collecting performance information 
on employees through the computers they use at work (George 1996). Much research 
conducted from the 1980s to 1990s in the field of IS addresses the issue of design, use, 
and impact of computerized monitoring systems.   
 Drawing on the cybernetic view of control, Grant and Higgins (1996) propose a 
multi-dimensional view of computer monitoring systems, which describes monitor 
designs in terms of object of measurements, tasks measured, recipients of data, reporting 
period, and message content. The contribution of this multi-dimensional view is that a 
monitoring system is no longer seen as a uniform black box. Computer monitoring 
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systems vary along several dimensions, which can be used as independent variables in 
later studies to investigate the impact of monitoring systems in depth. 
 Grant and Higgins (1991) also examine the impact of computerized performance 
monitoring and control systems (CPMCS) on employees’ attitudes towards work. 
Especially, they investigate how the design and use of CPMCSs affect the employees’ 
attitudes toward the relative importance of productivity and the relative importance of 
customer services. Based on the survey data collected on non-supervisory service 
workers that performed computer-mediated work and had direct contact with customers, 
the findings show that the use of CPMCS does not automatically decrease employees' 
perceived importance of service quality or increase employees' perceived importance of 
productivity. Instead, many other factors affect employees’ attitudes toward various job 
dimensions. Acceptance of CPMCS by employees is very essential. When a monitoring 
system is well-designed and appears to be credible, it can increase employees’ attitude 
toward importance of production. Otherwise, a monitoring system lacking credibility and 
acceptance can lead to employees' resistance and other negative reactions to monitoring. 
 George (1996) conducted case studies in five organizations that used computer 
monitoring in practice. He focuses on the following  aspects that have inconsistent 
findings in prior studies: employee attitudes toward computer-based monitoring, potential 
trade-off between quality of work and quantity of work, relationship between computer-
based monitoring, stress and illness, and employee's perceptions of supervision. He finds 
that the practices of computerized monitoring are not uniform across organizations. How 
monitoring is practiced and how monitoring data are used in employees’ evaluation differ 
significantly between organizations. Many factors lead to this variation, such as the type 
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of job, the data used for evaluation, management attitudes, and organizational culture. 
These variations in turn affect the impact of computer-based monitoring on employees 
and organizations.  
2.9.5 IS Studies on the Impact of IT on Organizational Controls 
 Orlikowski (1991) examines the impact of  information technologies deployed in 
work processes on the forms of control and forms of organizing. She finds that 
information technology augments and extends existing mechanisms of control as well as 
reinforces established forms of organizing. Specifically, when information technology 
mediates work processes, it creates an information environment that facilitates 
decentralization and flexible operations, and meanwhile generates a matrix of control by 
increasing the dependence on centralized knowledge and power.  
 Coombs, Knights et al. (1992) argue that although information technologies are 
rarely introduced into organizations for control purposes, they often result in 
intensification of  control by encouraging self-controls among organization members. 
This agrees with Foucault’s “disciplinary power” (Foucault 1979). Coombs, Knights et 
al. (1992) apply this theoretical idea to interpret a case study on the introduction of 
information systems to the U.K. National Health Service. The new information system 
required physicians to conduct extensive cost reporting. By using the information system, 
physicians shifted their attention toward the issue of resource cost, and subsequently 
redefined their criteria to select treatments and procedures. Consequently, physicians 
became dependent on the computer-mediated practices that involved them in the 
management such as cost control in addition to proving health services.  
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 Information availability and accuracy play an essential role in shaping the 
organization control system, no matter which control modes are adopted. The use of 
information systems not only automates work processes but also generate information 
about the underlying work processes, and therefore previously opaque information such 
as behaviors and outcomes become much more transparent between parties. Zuboff 
(1988) characterizes this phenomenon as “informating”. According to agency theory and 
the notion of informating, managers (principals) can successfully implement information 
systems to increase information transparency and tighten controls in most situations. 
However, when the employees (agents) are autonomous and managers lack the 
legitimacy to mandate that their employees use the information systems, problems will 
occur. Kohli and Kettinger (2004) conducted an action research study to learn how 
hospital managers can successfully implement information system to monitor and 
benchmark autonomous physicians’ medical practices. They call the process “informating 
the clan” because physicians are mostly self-managed and subject to concertive control.  
Eventually the system was implemented successfully after the hospital managers 
promoted an influential physician to direct the information systems implementation 
project, customized the interface of the system to improve ease of use, and facilitated 
discussion of the value of using such system within physician communities.  Kohli and 
Kettinger (2004) conclude that a clan can be informated if the principal can legitimized 
the “human messenger” and “technical messenger”, and facilitate clan-based discussion. 
In this case, the “human messengers” are the influential physicians, the “technical 
messengers” are the friendly user interface, and the clan-based discussions are the 
discussions within physicians’ community.   
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2.10 Studies on Organizational Controls in the Context of Telework 
There are a few studies investigating organizational controls in the context of 
telework. Kurland and Egan (1999) conducted a survey to study the relationships among 
telecommuting, organizational monitoring strategies (outcome-oriented or behavior-
oriented), and organizational justice perceptions (distributive, procedural, or interactional 
justice). They conclude that monitoring strategies are more strongly associated with 
organizational justice perceptions than with telecommuting, and procedural and 
interactional justice perceptions are significantly related to telecommuting. Kurland and 
Cooper (2002) studied how managers’ monitoring strategies (behavior, output, clan) link 
to telecommuters’ professional isolation concerns. Their findings show that supervisors 
in telework face the challenges to exercise clan strategies such as fostering synergy, 
replicating informal learning, and creating interpersonal relationships. As a result, 
telecommuters have fewer professional development opportunities and experience 
professional isolation in their work. Dimitrova (2003) examines the relationship between 
control and employees’ autonomy in telework. Through interviewing professional, 
managerial and sales teleworkers, the study finds that the changes in control and 
autonomy are limited to reconfiguration of the work schedule.  
Although these three studies in the context of telework all investigated 
organizational controls, their focus is to investigate the impact or the consequences of 
organizational controls on employees, whether it is perceived organizational justice 
(Kurland and Egan 1999), perceived professional isolation (Kurland and Cooper 2002) or 
employee autonomy (Dimitrova 2003). The studies only touch on the topic of how 
organizations exercise control in this relatively new work arrangement. Dimitrova (2003) 
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concludes that there are no significant changes between the management practices in 
telework and non-telework. Furthermore, these three studies do not explicitly investigate 
the role of information technologies in organizational controls in telework. Kurland and 
Cooper (2002) and Dimitrova (2003) state that they did not find that information 
technologies change the controls within telework. I believe that more detailed elaboration 
of the organizational controls in telework is needed because it may explain the resistance 
of telework programs from middle managers, and it is worthwhile to explore explicitly 
the role of information technologies because they are the key enablers of telework. 
Therefore, my research focuses on these two research gaps. 
2.11 Summary of Literature Review 
 In summary, control theories are a key area with a long-term research stream in 
organization studies. Any organization needs to implement control to align organization 
members’ diverse interests with overall organization goals. To better understand controls 
in organizations, researchers conceptualize control from different perspectives, such as 
regarding control as cybernetic systems or theorizing control in terms of principal-agent 
relationships. Researchers also differentiate among the types of controls. Within formal 
control systems, controls are categorized as behavior control or output control according 
to control targets. Market, bureaucracy, and clan are recognized as three sources of 
controls, each with its own coordination mechanism. In addition, self-control is proposed 
as an alternative to formal control systems. Traditionally, the research focus of controls 
investigates contingency factors that predict which controls should be used. Recently, 
researchers begin to study complex control systems. The research focus moves from 
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identifying suitable controls according to antecedent factors to combining different 
controls to establish a portfolio of controls.    
 Control issues have been studied in the field of information systems. In one 
stream of research, researchers study controls in the context related to information system 
design, development or implementation. A system development project is a complex 
process involving multiple parties with diverse interests, thus providing a suitable 
empirical context to test and advance control theories. At the same time, these studies 
also contribute to theoretical understanding of information system related phenomena. 
Another research stream contains studies of the impact of information technologies on 
controls. The availability of information technologies changes the organization 
environment, causing changes to organization controls. This research stream makes 
theoretical contributions by extending or revising control theories so that they can explain 
phenomena in new organizational forms enabled by information technologies. IS 
researchers also apply control theories to study computer-based performance monitoring 
systems.   
 Studies also focus on control issues in telework environments, and these studies 
examine the impact of controls on teleworking employees. As telework gains popularity 
in organizations, there is a need to study in-depth how organizations exercise controls in 
this work environment. 
3 Research Questions 
Telework is becoming increasingly popular because of the trend of knowledge 
economy, global-wise competition, and innovation in information technologies. Telework 
programs can benefit both the employers and the employees when successfully 
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implemented. Telework creates an organization environment that differs from the 
traditional office-based organization environment. Employees have flexibility to 
configure their work time and work place. Managers can no longer easily manage by 
walking around. Face-to-face interactions are decreased to a great degree. These new 
characteristics of work environments create challenges for managers of telework. We 
need formal knowledge about the management of telework to inform managers so that 
the organizations can successfully implement telework programs.  
Organizational control is one of the central problems of organization science. 
Prior theories on organizational controls suggest that there are four different forms of 
controls, formal controls such as behavior control and output control, and informal 
controls such as clan control and self-control. Depending on contingency conditions such 
as task and environment characteristics, different forms of controls operate in different 
organizational contexts and multiple controls can be combined into control portfolios. 
Because telework redefines the notion of the workplace and changes the organization 
environment, traditional control theories may not directly apply. Then how does the 
telework environment affect the use of different types of controls? Will organizations rely 
more on outcome control because it is difficult to monitor employee in remote settings? 
Will organizations rely on informal controls such as trust and employees self-discipline, 
or will organizations rely on the electronic traces such as contents of emails to obtain the 
information about the employees’ behaviors? How do these different forms of control 
operate together in telework? In summary, our first research question is:  
Research question 1: How do different forms of managerial controls operate in 
telework? 
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Moreover, information technologies are the key enablers of telework. In telework, 
employees rely on information technologies to work and to communicate. Prior studies in 
IS suggest that the use of information technologies can have an impact on controls. 
However, it has not been explored how the use of information technologies in telework 
relates to organizational controls. Are organizational controls embedded within the 
information technologies that employees use everyday? Do managers control employees’ 
behaviors about how they use information technologies? In summary, our second 
research question is :  
Research Question 2: How does the use of information technologies relate to the 
organizational controls in telework? 
4 Research Approach 
4.1 Research Assumptions and Research Paradigm 
It is recommended for social science researchers to state explicitly two 
philosophical assumptions - ontological and epistemological assumptions - because these 
are the two key assumptions underlying the design of social science research (Orlikowski 
and Baroudi 1991; Mason 2002). The ontological assumption is the researcher’ belief 
about the nature of the phenomena, entities, or social “reality” under investigation; that is, 
“whether the empirical world is assumed to be objective and hence independent of 
humans, or subjective and hence having existence only through the action of humans in 
creating and recreating it” (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). The epistemological 
assumption is the researcher’s belief about the nature of knowledge and evidence of the 
entities or social “reality” under investigation; that is, it is the researcher’s assumption 
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whether and how social phenomena can be known, and how knowledge can be 
demonstrated (Mason 2002). 
My ontological assumption aligns with that of critical realism. The essence of 
critical realism is the fusion of “…a stratified ‘naturalist’ ontology for the natural and 
social sciences with a non-deterministic, non-Humean notion of causality” (Smith 2006, 
p20). Critical realism differentiates two types of objects, intransitive objects and 
transitive objects. Intransitive objects are the things and structures independent of our 
perception of them. Transitive objects are “the artificial objects fashioned into items of 
knowledge by the science of the day” (Bhaskar 1998: p.16). Our knowledge (transitive) 
constitutes a part of the world (intransitive) that objectively exists. The distinction 
between transitive and intransitive objects allows for the combination of an ontological 
realism with an epistemological relativism (Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson and Norrie 
1998), meaning that reality is intransitive, theories are fallible and changeable, and we 
can exercise judgmental rationality to choose among competing theories (Danermark, 
Ekstrom, Jokobsen and Karlsson 2003). 
Critical realism accepts two forms of stratification. The first form of stratification 
is between mechanisms, the events that they generate, and the subset of events that are 
actually experienced (Mingers 2004). These three domains are also known as the real 
(what exists), the actual (events), and the empirical (observable events). At the deepest 
level, “the real” level, the whole of reality exists, including mechanisms, events, and 
experiences. The “actual” contains the states and happenings resulting from the activation 
of the causal powers at “the real” level. Furthermore, “the empirical” are the collection of 
events in “the actual” that can be observed or experienced. This stratification shows us 
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that we should not reduce all events to only the observed events, and we should not 
reduce enduring causal mechanisms to events (Mingers 2004). The second stratification 
is within the realm of objects themselves (Archer, Bhaskar et al. 1998). Causal 
relationships at one level (e.g., chemical reactions) can be seen as generated by those of a 
lower level (atomic valence). These dynamic, open, and stratified systems will interact 
with each other, and particular structures give rise to certain causal powers or tendencies 
(Mingers 2004), which are called by Bhaskar “generative mechanisms” (Bhaskar 1979, p. 
170). The generative mechanisms interact with each other, and possibly counterbalance 
each other, causing the presence or absence of actual events. Because of the two forms of 
stratification, the structure and generative mechanisms of objects decouple from the 
events that they produce, and the mechanisms in “the real” domain do not pre-determine 
what will happen at any particular time but rather enable what can possibly happen. In 
other words, mechanisms are better to be understood as tendencies rather than universal 
laws (Smith 2006). 
The phenomenon under investigation in my research is organizations’ controls in 
telework. I acknowledge the three-level ontological stratification of this phenomenon. At 
“the real” level, there exist physical objects, social objects and social structures, and their 
generative mechanisms, which are independent of our perception of them. Physical 
objects include information technologies that the employees adopt and use. Social objects 
include users’ habits and behaviors. Social structures include rules and resources around 
control issues in telework. We believe that generative mechanisms exist for control issues 
in telework. That is, there exist certain causal powers, tendencies, and ways of acting that 
can explain why and how a certain control will or will not work in telework environment. 
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These generative mechanisms interact with other generative mechanisms in “the real” to 
activate the events and happenings about organizations’ controls in telework at “the 
actual” level. As researchers, we can observe the events at “the empirical” level, which is 
only a subset of events at “the actual level”. 
Epistemological assumptions are the researcher’s beliefs about how social 
phenomena can be known, and how knowledge can be demonstrated (Mason 2002). 
Epistemology “…concerns the criteria by which valid knowledge about a phenomenon 
may be constructed and evaluated” (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). My epistemological 
assumption aligns with that of interpretivism. “A fundamental distinction between the 
interpretive and positivist world view is the former’s primary presumption of social 
constructionism. Interpretive studies assume that people create and associate their own 
subjective and inter-subjective meaning as they interact with the world around them” 
(Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). Thus, despite the assumption of a real world independent 
of human perceptions, our knowledge of that world is inevitably affected by social 
interpretivism.   
In my study of organizational controls in telework, although I believe that there 
are “generative mechanisms” or tendencies independent of human beings, I also believe 
that the process by which  people come to understand and gain knowledge about these 
“generative mechanisms” is a social construction process. At the same time, researchers’ 
investigation on this issue by gathering data at “the empirical” level is also a social 
construction process. Therefore, people’s account of their perceptions and experiences of 
the controls in telework are valid evidence of knowledge, and my theoretical 
interpretation of the phenomena advance the knowledge of the problem area.  
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Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) explain that interpretive researchers should avoid 
imposing externally defined categories on a phenomenon; rather, they should attempt to 
derive their constructs from the field by in-depth examination of the phenomenon of 
interest. Walsham (1995a) argues that interpretive studies are suitable for the field of 
information system because people’s perceptions regarding information systems use are 
essential. . Furthermore, an interpretive paradigm is appropriate for studying social 
processes because this  paradigm is explicitly designed to capture complex, dynamic, 
social phenomena that are both context and time dependent (Orlikowski and Baroudi 
1991). The research problem under investigation in my study is a complex and contextual 
social process. Therefore, even as I acknowledge the objectivity of “generative 
mechanisms” underlying the phenomenon, I believe that the phenomenon can be 
observed and understood by studying my perceptions and interpretations of it, which are 
subjective. Thus, interpretive inquiry allows me to capture and analyze the organizations’ 
controls and employees’ perceptions about the controls in telework.  
 The interpretive paradigm is not completely homogeneous. Orlikowski and 
Baroudi (1991) differentiate between two variants of interpretive research: the “weak” 
and the “strong” constructionist views. From the weak constructionist view, interpretive 
research is thought to take a complementary position to positivist research. The strong 
constructionist view claims that interpretive research should replace positivist 
investigations. Similarly, Walsham (1995a) distinguishes among four different levels of 
rhetoric qualifying interpretive work. In increasing order of their claims, those levels are: 
the rhetoric of the exploratory study, the complementary approach rhetoric, the rhetoric 
of appropriate research issues, and the replacement of positivism rhetoric. My research 
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stands at the second and third rhetorical positions of Walsham’s framework - the 
complementary approach rhetoric and the rhetoric of appropriate research issues. Under 
the former rhetoric, interpretive and positivist research are seen as complementary and of 
an equal status. Under the latter rhetoric, certain research issues fit the interpretive 
approach, while others better fit the positivist approach. My own interpretive position is 
“moderate.” I view the interpretive approach as more suited to research building theory, 
and meanwhile I also value different approaches (such as those embodied in the positivist 
paradigm) to proceed to thorough theory testing, and thus complete the full research cycle 
(Galliers 1991). In other words, I believe that a qualitative research study is complete in 
itself and should not be seen only as a pilot study or as preliminary to quantitative 
research (Bottorff 1997). However, I am not against subjecting the results of qualitative 
work, including those of the present research, to further empirical testing, evaluation, and 
generalization. These assumptions are completely consistent with critical realism, which 
asserts reality as objective and which values multiple research methods (Mingers 2004).  
4.2 Research Methodology 
4.2.1 Grounded Theory 
 The research method followed by this study is grounded theory (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967; Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 1989; Strauss and Corbin 1990). Applying grounded 
theory research methodology, I studied two work groups with an objective of generating 
a descriptive and explanatory theory about organizational controls in a telework 
environment.   
 The grounded theory method (Strauss and Corbin 1990; Glaser 1992) is a 
“qualitative research method that uses a systematic set of procedures to develop an 
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inductively derived theory about a phenomenon” (Strauss and Corbin 1990, p 24). The 
resulting grounded theory specifies  the relationships among concepts and sets of 
concepts with empirical evidences, and the theory  can be in the  form of a narrative 
statement, visual picture, or in a series of hypotheses or propositions (Creswell 1998). 
The benefit of the grounded theory approach is that the resulting theory is intimately tied 
to the evidence (Eisenhardt 1989). Three intrinsic procedures in grounded theory are 
inductive reasoning, interwoven data collection and data analysis, and theoretical 
sampling.  
 Using grounded theory, researchers do not specify theory a priori and then 
confirm the theory empirically. Instead, researchers apply inductive reasoning to discover 
theory emerging from empirical qualitative data. The method allows researchers to 
“develop a theoretical account of the general features of a topic while simultaneously 
grounding the account in empirical observations or data” (Martin and Turner 1986, p 
141).  This inductive, theory discovery research mode can be particularly useful when no 
prior theory has been established to date. Although control theories in general have 
existed for a long time, they could not be directly applied in the new organizational 
environment because telework differs from a traditional office-based work environment. 
Therefore, I believe it is appropriate to employ grounded theory approach to elaborate 
and extend control theories and to generate a theoretical account for the particular 
phenomenon that I investigated.     
 Grounded theory requires that data collection be tightly interwoven with data 
analysis. In the research process, both activities occur simultaneously, and data and 
theory are constantly compared and contrasted during data collection and analysis. The 
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emerging theoretical account generated from analysis of data collected in early stages 
guides the data collection in later stages (Locke 1996). The interwoven nature of data 
collection and analysis makes it possible for analysis to direct the process of theoretical 
sampling, which refers to the technique of selecting incidents and informants on the basis 
of concepts that are relevant to the emerging theoretical account. Theoretical sampling 
applies both to the selection of the research site selection and the selection of the study 
informants 
 The findings of  grounded theory studies are detailed and particularistic, but a 
more general explanation can be produced from the results (Eisenhardt 1989; Leonard-
Barton 1990). The generalization here is different from the more typical statistical 
generalization, which refers to generalizing from a sample to population. Rather, the 
generalization is “analytic generalization” (Yin 1989), meaning that inductive concepts 
generated by the field study are combined with insights from existing formal theory 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967). So what is generalized is the theoretical concepts and patterns. 
The outcome of my study is a general conceptualization of the organizational controls in 
telework that should both contribute to our research knowledge and inform IS practice.  
 Since two schools of thought now exist in the grounded theory approach, 
grounded theorists often need to take a stand on a specific version of the methodology 
(Boudreau 1999). The two schools of thought in grounded theory are the Straussian (after 
Anselm Strauss) and the Glaserian (after Barney Glaser), each presenting different 
assumptions and methods (Stern 1994). Locke (1996) summarizes the key difference 
between the two schools. The Straussian school encourages the researchers to take an 
active, even provocative role when collecting and analyzing the data, whereas the 
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Glaserian school suggests that researchers should prevent and minimize their impact on 
the data and allow the data to speak for themselves. In my research, I applied the 
grounded theory methodology aligned with the Straussian school of thought. First, I agree 
that it is difficult to pursue research with a “clean slate”. Second, my research intends to 
provide a theoretical account of organizational controls in telework to extend or refine the 
existing theories on organizational controls, Last, my research is primarily based on the 
methods and procedures presented in Strauss and Corbin (1990). Thus I followed the 
Straussian school when conducting this study. 
4.2.2 Research Site 
In site selection, I followed the strategic sampling technique for qualitative 
research, which means choosing a site or group that will provide some insights about the 
main research questions. Because the phenomenon under investigation is organizations’ 
controls in telework, I accessed a site where employees primarily worked at home and 
away from their managers. Time limitation compels me to investigate a single 
organization as opposed to many. This is not problematic, given that data generated 
through the investigation of a single site is likely to be comprehensive enough to conduct 
a thorough exploration of the control issue in telework.  
 The research site is two groups within a large corporation, TechCo1. TechCo 
develops innovative information technologies products and services and has employees 
around the globe. In order to attract and retain talent around the globe and save real estate 
costs, TechCo promotes telework with their employees. Within corporate resources, there 
is a division of people, Telework Support Program, working especially for the purpose of 
                                                 
1 All names are pseudonyms. 
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supporting TechCo’s telework environment. Meanwhile, employees within Telework 
Support Program also practice telework in their daily work. I accessed two work groups 
within Telework Support Program, Work Location Service Group and Product 
Development Group as our research site.  
 These two groups were ideal for the study because they not only practiced 
telework but they also promoted it at TechCo. In contrast to groups involved in Software 
Engineering (who seemed less receptive to being studied), the Telework Support Program 
was receptive to my efforts to study telework. Therefore, selecting these two groups was 
aligned with the principle of theoretical sampling.   
4.2.3 Data Generation 
 In this research, I used qualitative interviews as my primary data collection 
method. Choosing interviews as primary data sources best serves the research goal and 
agrees with my research methodology strategy. The research question is to investigate 
and understand the organizations’ controls in telework. People’s interpretations, 
perceptions, meanings and understandings of their experiences with controls in telework 
are the major data I sought to collect. Qualitative interviewing is an effective method to 
get the inside views from study participants. Moreover, although in theory it would be 
ideal to conduct observations to complement interview data sources, it was not feasible in 
practice because the study participants worked primarily at home and were remote from 
each other and from me.  
 The targeted interviewees included people who exercise control and people who 
are controlled in telework. I conducted interviews from June 2007 to December 2007. I 
first interviewed the primary contact and the director of the Telework Support Program to 
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understand the general work practice of Telework Support Program, and then I 
interviewed the directors and employees in two workgroups, Work Location Service 
Group and Product Development Group, within Telework Support Program. The 
interviews were conducted face-to-face if possible or via telephone when face-to-face 
interviews could not be arranged. Each person within the two work groups was 
interviewed twice, and each interview ranged from 45 minutes to two hours. Table 1 
shows the number of interviews. I began each interview with open-ended questions 
related to our research. For example, to investigate organizational controls in telework, I 
asked the interviewees, “How does your organization, your managers, and you yourself 
make sure that you work productively even when you work at home?” In order to 
investigate how the use of information technologies related to organizational controls in 
telework, I asked the interviewees, “Describe the adoption and use of a particular 
information technology in your work and how is your manager involved in this process?” 
After the starting questions, the interviews were in conversational style and the following 
questions or probes depended on the answers given by a specific study participant.  
  Table 1: Study Participants and Interviews 
Participants Interviews 
Telework Support Program Director 1 
Primary contact in Telework Support Program  1 
Work Location Service Group Director 2 
Work Location Service group team members (4 
people) 
8 
Product Development Group Director 2 
Product Development Group Team members (7 
people) 
14 
Other employees in TechCo (8 people). 8 
Total 36 
  
 Strauss and Corbin (1990) state that in grounded theory inquiry theoretical 
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sampling cannot be planned before embarking on the study and the specific sampling 
decisions should evolve during the research process itself. Therefore, the data collection 
phase is parallel with the data analysis phase. Analysis of data obtained in the early stage 
is used to guide data collection in later stages. I followed this principle in my research. I 
first interviewed people in Location Service Group, conducted preliminary analysis on 
the data and used the results of the analysis to direct my interviews with people in 
Product Development Group. I exited the field when I reached “theoretical saturation”, 
meaning that I exited when I could not identify new themes from my interviews.    
4.2.4 Data Analysis 
The objective of data analysis is to subject the interview transcriptions to 
interpretation using coding analysis techniques. I conducted data analysis using three 
phases of coding suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1990): open, axial, and selective 
coding. My overall research strategy is inductive, meaning that theory is developed 
through data generation and data analysis (Mason 2002). I did not formulate  hypotheses 
based on the literature prior to my empirical research. I did review the prior literature on 
controls to increase my sensitivities with regard to the research problem, and these 
literatures provided me a starting point in my research. Increasing the researcher’ 
sensitivity on the research problem at hand by reading literatures is recommended by 
Strauss and Corbin (1990).   
 This research strategy directs my data analysis phase. By iterating from data and 
theory, I eventually generated theoretical explanations. 
Step 1: Open coding 
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The data analysis started with open coding. The incidents, events, quotes and 
other instances gathered during data generation were compared to examine similarities 
and differences. From the transcribed interviews and notes, similar data were grouped 
together and labeled by categorical codes. In open coding, I first developed an initial list 
of codes based on my literature review on control theories. The initial  list of codes is 
listed in appendix 1. Control mechanisms of outcome control, behavior control, clan 
control and self-controls were identified and used as codes. I also coded   employees’ 
uses of information technologies. When applying these codes to the interview 
transcription, there were some incidents and quotes that did not fit into these existing 
codes, which required that I generated new codes for them.  
Step 2: Axial coding 
After open coding was finished, I made adjustments by combining redundant 
codes. I conducted axial coding by organizing data according to the recurring theme and 
linked the associated concepts to uncover the relationships among categories and 
subcategories. The results of axial coding were a set of broad categories and associated 
concepts that described and explained the organizational controls in telework.  The codes 
I used are listed in Appendix 2.  
 Step 3: Selective coding 
 After the general concepts and the relationships among these concepts were 
generated, I conducted selective coding with an objective to uncover larger patterns by 
integrating all analyses into one “core category”. The results of this analysis stage were a 
story line describing a coherent conceptualization of the main phenomenon. Selective 
coding was terminated when I reached theoretical saturation, which is indicated by the 
 53
fact that no new or relevant data inform a category, the category development is densely 
populated, and the relationships between categories are supported by adequate evidences.  
 Multiple Exemplars Data Presentation 
 In my analysis and results presentation, I used the “multiple exemplars” method 
(Denzin 1989; Bechky 2006). Multiple exemplars is a qualitative study method that 
allows the researchers to deconstruct prior conceptions of a particular phenomenon, 
collect multiple instances that illustrate the concepts under study, and inspect these 
instances carefully for essential elements or components. The elements are then 
reassembled into a story line in a logical order.  to . In my study, first I provided the 
description of the social contexts of the both group. Then, rather than analyzing control 
within each participant group, I collected control instances from both of the participating 
groups, used these instances as exemplars of control mechanisms, and described them 
according to control forms. 
5 Results 
5.1 Social Contexts of the Two Groups 
 
 Work Location Service Group. Work Location Service Group (WLSG) group is a 
work team within TechCo’s Telework Support Program. This team works on global work 
location strategy, meaning that they identify, document, and facilitate the global 
deployment for TechCo. Since TechCo is a global company and has workers in many 
countries and areas, this group supports decision making regarding the locations in which 
TechCo is going to invest or disinvest on a global basis. The typical issues that they 
address are where TechCo will have workforce, what skill sets will be required for the 
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workforce, and what infrastructures (including physical, technology, and work practice) 
will be needed for the new workforce. To achieve this purpose, they conduct research on 
the demographics of different locations around the world, and constantly monitor trends 
within the company. Their work activities include online research, gathering data by 
interviewing internal or external stakeholders, analyzing data, and writing reports.  
 WLSG is a small group, and the team members are distributed. They have one 
group director and four group members. The group leader, Kevin, and one of the group 
members, Mary, live in the Bay area, California and are close to TechCo’s headquarters. 
The other three group members -- Kate, Mathew, and Roan -- live in Colorado near 
another TechCo campus. Four of the five people (all except Mary) are home-based and 
thus primarily work at home. Mary is flex-based. She comes to office regularly but has 
no permanently assigned office. Team member Roan and Kate joined the group one year 
ago and are relatively new to the group. All members have worked for TechCo for a long 
period except Mary who has worked for TechCo for only two years.  
 Since their group is distributed, they rely on technologies for everyday 
communications. Email and phone are the primary tools. Instant messenger is used 
among Mary, Mathew, and Kevin. They occasionally use an online collaborative tool 
called WebEx. They physically meet at least twice a year either in the Bay area or in 
Colorado. Otherwise they hold weekly teams meetings and one-on-one meetings with 
their manager electronically. 
 Product Development Group. The product development group (PDG) is a group 
within TechCo’s Telework Support Program. This group is responsible for designing and 
developing “products” to support the distributed work environment in TechCo. The 
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products include real estate design, information technologies, and human resource work 
practices. The typical work assignments for this group include designing information 
systems such as office reservation systems, online data collaboration tools, architectures 
for new office buildings, and new performance mapping and reward systems to fit the 
telework environment.  
 There are currently eight people in the group, reduced from 12 by a recent 
reduction of workforce. Their group includes people from three different backgrounds: 
real estate (2 people), information technology (5 people), and human resources (1 
person). They are a distributed team, all based primarily at home. The manager, Mack, is 
located on the East coast. One group member lives in Arizona, and another one in New 
Jersey. The other members of the group are located in the Bay area and live within 
driving distance of TechCo headquarters. They hold face-to-face meetings at least twice a 
year, and they hold virtual group meetings every two weeks. Since most of the 
technology subgroup lives within driving distance of their office building, the have a 
separate group meeting and social activities on campus every week. Because of the nature 
of their work, PDG constantly experiments with different information technologies to 
support telework. Besides using phone and email to communicate, they are mandated by 
their manager to use an online calendar, video camera, and instant messenger.  
After the reduction of the workforce, the nature of work and direction of the 
group changed. The new plan emphasizes more on the human resource aspect of mobile 
virtual work, and the technology sub-group is moving away from developing 
technologies to support Telework and toward researching new technologies that have 
potential to support virtual work. 
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5.2 Organizational Controls within the Two Work Teams 
I found that these two teams are managed by a combination of four forms of 
controls: outcome, behavioral, clan and self-controls. 
5.2.1 Outcome Controls 
5.2.1.1 Goal Setting Process 
TechCo had organizational-level policies on goal setting and goal cascading 
processes. At the beginning of each fiscal year, first the vice-president-level managers set 
the goals, followed by goals set at the director-level managers and then the employees. 
The employees became owners or partial owners of the goals. The company encouraged 
the managers to manage employees according to the goals rather than exercising personal 
and direct supervision. 
Both of the groups followed this goal setting process in their work. The managers 
acknowledged that the goal setting was of great importance in their work and believed 
that clear goal setting could reduce the need for constantly monitoring their employees. 
Kevin, WLSG team director, focused on setting goals and setting associated timeframes 
to reach these goals, and he expressed that he cared less about his employee’s working 
behaviors on a daily basis as long as the goals were met on time.  
“I don’t mind if they spend 8 o’clock in the morning to 6 o’clock in the night 
working, or 8 o’clock to 6 o’clock in the zoo, as long as they meet their goals and 
don’t’ miss the deadline.” Kevin, WLSG team director 
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The goals were very detailed. The goals could be about an ongoing projects or 
routine work. For example, a WLSG team member, had these goals for the following 
year: 
“(the goals) will be continuing on with the GIS project to implement the GIS, get 
training on the GIS as well as ensure training for others in our group and 
additionally I will have goals around the financial work I am doing on the 
budget….” Roan, WLSG team member 
The managers strived to set specific and clear goals with their employees, and 
there were quantifiable metrics around the goals so that they could be easily measured 
when it came to the performance evaluation time.  
“TechCo likes to have sort of quantitative metrics around your goals, so you 
know. You write one report a quarter…, there is a number associated with it.” 
Roan, WLSG team member. 
During the working process, goals were adjusted based on the current trend in the 
company. Goals set at the beginning of the fiscal year were used as a guideline for their 
work, but goals were evaluated periodically and priorities could change over time.  
“On a quarterly basis, we will formally assess how we did. Do we meet our 
objectives, do we fall behind? If for some reasons, this thing falls off the agenda, 
if something else comes up --  we don’t need 4000 engineers on Minneapolis, 
what we want is, 5000 sales people in Oshkosh -- OK. If that’s what is been told 
by the company, let’s go down that path instead.” Kevin, WLSG team director 
 At the end of the fiscal year, when it came to the evaluation of the employees’ 
performance, the goals set at the beginning of the year played an important role. 
 58
According to Matthew, WLSG team member, there was a detailed performance review 
about what goals were achieved and what goals were not achieved. When the goals were 
not met, there was an analysis whether it was intentional or unintentional, whether the 
goal fell off the priority list and became irrelevant, or it was still relevant but was not 
achieved. There were also discussions about goals that were supposed to be on the list but 
were missing, and things that had been done but were not on the list. 
5.2.1.2 Focus on Deliverables 
In both groups, managers emphasized deliverables. For each work assignment, the 
managers specified the deliverables and time frame to complete them. The employees 
were measured on the quality and the timeliness of the deliverables. Mack, PDG team 
leader, stated that the deliverables in his group were very specific.  
 “They can be very simplistic, such as the physical design standards or the 
functional requirements for technologies to support [remote] work. They are 
written documents.” Mack, PDG team leader 
The managers believed that specifying and evaluating employees’ deliverables 
could greatly, if not totally, replace monitoring employees’ behaviors on a day-to-day 
basis, and thus they emphasized that they evaluate employees based on the “product” 
rather than “process”. 
“I am not going to judge you for being in the office for extended periods. I am 
going to presume I give you work you can get it done...I am going to measure you 
on your work product.” Kevin, WLSG team leader  
Between getting clear instructions for deliverables and turning in deliverables for 
evaluations, the employees worked rather independently. The management style was 
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hands-off rather than micro managing. Mack, PDG team leader, expressed that working 
independently was absolutely critical in his group.  
“I am not going to tell you exactly how to build it, or how to create it, I want you 
to tell me.… That is why we pay you to be expert…In some sense there is this 
dichotomy that I am going to give you very very quantifiable deliverables, but I 
want you to work independently to get to them.” Mack, PDG team leader 
On the employee side, they felt that being evaluated on the quality and timeliness 
of the deliverables made the work environment more “fair”. 
“I think it is much more egalitarian when you are at home. You are judged more 
on the merits of the output.” Matthew, WLSG team member  
5.2.1.3  Checkpoints 
 While the employees worked on deliverables that were associated with the goals, 
there were regular updates about the status of the work, which were referred as 
“checkpoints”. Status update was a policy of the company that specified that the 
employees should provide status updates every quarter. But in reality the status updates 
happened more frequently than quarterly.  
Much of the work these two groups did was research. Due to the uncertainties and 
risks involved in research work, often ideal output could not be produced, and sometimes 
the results of the research could not be immediately deployed. To address this concern, 
checkpoints were scheduled according to the phase of the project. For example, 
checkpoints might occur after the research results were delivered but before they were 
deployed. This was to ensure that work was acknowledged even when it could not be 
immediately deployed.  
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“We will research and experiment, and we will do some sort of pilot if necessary. 
Then we will take it up to these ladders, at the very end, a gateway, somebody will 
say yes or no (to deploy it). …. For Mack’s eyes, he needs to see if that project 
gets to that point, if it does get to that point (but cannot be deployed immediately), 
we will just take a look of the research we have done. …We will put it in a folder 
so people can get to it because people are just not ready for it right now.” Chad, 
PDG team member  
The checkpoints could be initiated by either the manager or by the employees. 
Manager-initiated checkpoints often happened in the regular group meetings or in one-
on-one meetings between the managers and the employees. In some cases, the managers 
required the employees to publish periodic status reports.  
“I have a teleconference with my entire team every week, where we go through 
updates, pass downs… as well as 10 minute reviews with each person about, how 
was your portfolio work? In addition to that, I have 1 hour calls with each person, 
where I walk through their portfolio activity. And once a month we publish a full 
status.” Kevin, WLSG team leader 
Interestingly, checkpoints were also initiated by the employees. Employees often 
reported to their managers what they were working on and their progress on the projects 
even when the managers did not ask them to do so. This phenomenon is commonly seen 
among the employees in these two groups. For example, Sage worked in Arizona, not 
only away from his manager, but also away from his peers and any TechCo campuses. 
He reported that he felt the need to proactively communicate to his managers about his 
work status after he started working from home.  
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“Since I have been working from home…I’ve started to make sure I work 
proactive in communicating, just to my own boss, what I am working on, what is 
my status, what I am doing? Even if it is good, even it is I am on track. If it is due 
in two weeks, one week has expired, I’ve done a week’s worth. I have one week 
left. I will tell him that, so he knows.” Sage, PDG team member 
In addition to reporting their positive progress on the projects, the employees also 
took initiatives to ask for their managers’ inputs when the employees could not 
independently solve a problem.   
The major reason behind the employee-initiated checkpoints was the employees’ 
concern about visibility. Almost all the employees who worked at home reported that 
they needed to take initiative to obtain visibility, and taking initiative to report their work 
status was one of the important avenues to achieve this. Belinda, PDG team member, 
periodically made appointments with her director or upper level management to talk 
about her current work and the directions of her future work.  
“You don’t want them to forget the work that you are doing and the value you 
bring to the organization. So having kinda strategic check-ins, it fills a lot of 
purposes. One, yes, I know about the strategic directions, I am fine with 
continuing. But two, also reminds them just what it is what I am doing, where I 
am, that type of thing.” Belinda, PDG team member 
 The second reason behind the employee-initiated checkpoints was that some 
employees felt that in the telework environment, informal encounters were lacking. In an 
office-based work setting, informal status updates could happen in casual talks in the 
hallways or cafeterias.  These opportunities for informal encounters were missing in 
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telework, and so employees took initiatives to report their work status to make up for the 
lost opportunities. Sage, PDG team member, primarily worked at home and was distant 
from his boss and any major TechCo campus. He expressed concerns about lacking 
informal conversations with his boss.  
“You know, there is something missing…I felt like I could call my boss in Boston 
any time. I wasn’t cut off. But if you never call you boss unless there is something 
formal or important, and you didn’t have a few casual hallway bumps -- those are 
the things that just stopped happening. You are kinda left with a gap or a hole” 
Sage, PDG team member 
 The major distinction between employee-initiated checkpoints and other outcome 
control mechanisms was that the other control mechanisms were imposed by the 
manager, while the employee-initiated check points were initiated by the employees.  
5.2.1.4 Issues with Outcome Control 
The managers and the employees expressed concerns that, although they relied 
heavily on outcome controls, sometimes it was difficult or even unjustifiable to apply 
outcome controls. First, interactions between people and relationship building were 
important in TechCo. These two groups conducted knowledge work. In addition to 
producing results, these groups also had responsibility for sharing the knowledge 
produced with the right people within the company through people interactions. These 
people elements were difficult to capture within the outcome control.   
“I think managing by results are probably 80%. That is gotta be 15% based on 
subjective. The 15% human elements...Do not forget that… it may not be 
measured in the results oriented piece.” Cadee, PDG team member 
 63
Second, the research work done by these two groups involved uncertainties and 
risks. Even if the employees worked hard, satisfactory outcome might not be easily 
produced. In this sense, using outcome controls was not justified.  
“Some of us are tech professionals that are 10 years or more out of schools. We 
are solving problems that may not have been solved before… and there are maybe 
a lot of creativity involved in the solution. What that means is that some percent of 
the time you try, you will fail.” Diamond, PDG team member 
Third, because research work was creative and original, the end results could not 
be easily measured objectively. Thus, results were measured subjectively. This meant that 
the outcome of the work had low measurability, which made exercising outcome controls 
unsuitable.  
“My own job, making meetings more productive.…. So obviously you are talking 
about white collar productivity and no one knows how to measure that. Maybe 
Mack did my review and says, ‘I think she did a good job.’ But I could work for 
someone else... They weren’t that happy…I did exactly the same work, I got 
different results.” Diamond, PDG team member 
 In summary, these two groups were managed by outcome controls. The outcome 
control mechanisms included goal setting process, deliverable focus, and checkpoints. 
Meanwhile, these two groups expressed that the nature of their work, research type of 
work, made outcome control incomplete to some degree.  
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5.2.2 Behavioral Control  
5.2.2.1 Rules and Protocols 
Both work groups set up rules and protocols for appropriate behaviors related to 
availability, the use of technologies, and the workflow. Rules and protocols were critical 
for maintaining the efficiency and quality of their work. There were some corporate-level 
guidelines, but most of the rules and protocols were set up at the team level. Mack, PDG 
team director, referred these protocols as roadmaps and blueprints for the team.  
“We have all these roadmaps, blueprints, whatever you want to call it for doing 
remote work. …we tried it very hard it make it part of our DNA.” Mack, PDG 
team director 
There were clear protocols explicitly set up by the managers, and there were soft 
rules gradually formed during the work process. Soft rules will be further elaborated in 
the clan control section. The content of the protocols included availability management, 
the use of technologies, and workflow. Availability management and the use of 
technologies will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.  Below is an 
example of the protocols on workflow.  
“We try to have some sort of protocols, who can and who cannot update 
something. At the beginning of the project, we are going to define, OK. You are 
someone who is going to update stuff. You are in charge of the specific part of the 
project. So you are in charge of these sets of documents.” Chad, PDG team 
member 
When the rules and protocols were not followed, the managers exercised 
sanctions. For example, in PDG group, there was a rule about using instant messenger 
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(IM), an online tool with which people can exchange messages instantly. All people were 
required to be logged into instant messenger during work time. One of the employees in 
PDG did not follow the protocols about using IM, and he was laid off in workforce 
reduction. Mack recalled one conversation he had with this person. 
“I said, ’you just refused to use IM.’ ’Well, it isn’t something I am comfortable 
with’, then I said, “Get comfortable because I don’t know what the hell you are 
doing 50% of the time.’ That did not change. He was so set in his ways… He no 
longer works for us.”Mack, PDG team director  
This example shows that the manager explicitly specified the behavioral 
standards, and when the employees violated the protocols, there was punishment 
associated with it.  
5.2.2.2 Availability Management 
In telework, employees have flexibility to decide their own work time and space. 
However, being available and accessible during work time and even in extended work 
time became a behavior standard in both groups. To ensure availability, the managers 
used three control mechanisms.  
 First, the managers made themselves highly available to their employees, working 
as a role model for the employees. Through role modeling, the managers sent the 
message to their employees that the appropriate behavior in telework was being available.  
“He (the director) is there when you need to reach him and get a hold of him, ask 
a question or need guidance. He doesn’t make you feel like if you call him out of 
the blue, that he is still busy, that he cannot give you his time of the day. He is 
very responsive.” Cadee, PDG team member 
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 Second, the managers set up specific rules and protocols about availability and 
accessibility. TechCo used a technology that enabled its employees to forward their 
office phone number to any phone that they were using. Kevin asked all his group 
members to make themselves available through this phone number during work time. 
Kevin explained his expectation for his team members on availability.   
“You have a follow-me-phone. You have a number that goes with you wherever 
you go. If you step out of the office, I expect this to be with you. During work 
hours, I need to be able to get hold of you. If you were here in the office, I could 
walk down the hall way to see you. So I need the ability to get you on the phone. If 
you go off (the follow-me-phone) in an extended period, I need to know.” Kevin, 
WLSG team director 
The third way of managing availability was through the use of technologies. 
Various information technologies were used to enable availability management. When 
employees adopted and used these technologies, they automatically made themselves 
available and accessible during work time.  
The first mechanism was schedule sharing and it was embedded within the use of 
the online calendar. The online calendar was linked to emails, so everyone got informed 
by email when anyone within the group updated the calendar. 
 “We usually email back and forth, we keep a master calendar...You know, 
Matthew is out. Kate will be gone from 2 until 4. Mary has a doctor appointment 
from 9 to 10. Open emailing. We all share each other’s calendars.”Kevin, WLSG 
team director 
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The second control mechanism was presence awareness and it was embedded 
within the use of the IM. The managers required the employees to adopt IM and that 
employees indicate their presence through it.  
“We use IM for… presence awareness. It means, OK, I am logging into IM and I 
am on, and I will log in sometimes when I am sick, and I will say, ’out sick’. So 
yeah, people know it, I am still in some level of access.” Mack, PDG team leader 
The third control mechanism was “the follow-me phone number” embedded 
within the use of mobile phone and phone forwarding technology. The employees could 
route a phone number to whichever phone they were using at any moment so that they 
could be reached anytime anywhere. For example, Cadee, PDG team member, worked in 
her vacation home in Florida in winter away from her home in Massachusetts and still 
was available thanks to using these technologies.   
“Actually most of the people don’t know that I work in Florida for most of the 
winter. You know, I have my cell phone, and my access line is forwarded to my 
cell phone... You could call me and you think you are calling me in 
Massachusetts.” Cadee, PDG team member 
 In summary, being available through information technologies was one of the 
important behavior standards in telework. The managers managed the employees’ 
availability through role modeling, rules and protocols, and the control mechanisms were 
embedded in the use of information technologies. 
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5.2.2.3 Managing the Use of Information Technologies 
Because the employees in these two groups were distributed in the telework 
environment, they relied on information technologies to communicate and work, and 
therefore the use of information technologies played an important role in the two teams.  
Managers exercised behavioral control in the form of controlling the adoption and use of 
these technologies. In this section, we primarily use the adoption and use of IM in PDG 
team as an exemplar. The reason why we use IM instead of other technologies as 
exemplar is because IM was more recently adopted than the other technologies such as 
emails and follow-me-phones. The interviewees were better able to recall and elaborate 
their experiences with the adoption and use of IM.  
 IM had multiple uses in the PDG group. It was used for indicating presence and 
status, for facilitating quick conversations, for working as a supplemental communication 
channel in teleconferences, and for other purposes.  
“It (IM) is a presence indicator; it is absolute substitute for hall way 
conversation; a post-it-’come see me or call me’-stick on the door;…it is the side 
bar conversation during the meeting.” Diamond, PDG team member 
 The side bar conversation mentioned by Diamond meant private talks between 
people sitting close to each other during a formal meeting. In a teleconference, everyone 
was on the phone, making it impossible to carry on any private talks. With IM, people 
could have side bar conversations during a teleconference. 
 The director in the PDG group made it clear to his group members that logging 
into instant messenger was one of the behavior standards.  
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 “I don’t require them to come to the office, I don’t require them to punch a time 
card, but I do require on any working day, they are on their instant messenger. 
You put ‘I am gonna be on vacation’, or ’I am gonna be in a conference’, ’I am 
traveling.’”Mack, PDG team director 
 People in PDG team had various attitudes toward using IM for work purposes. 
Some of the team members had already adopted this technology in their personal lives, 
and thus the transition for these people was relatively easy. But some people in the group 
were reluctant to adopt the technologies for different reasons. Seely, PDG team member, 
described this variation.  
“I used IM previously with other friends, but started to use it with people in the 
group a few months ago, which is now becoming more natural. There are people 
who still don’t IM and it cannot be natural for them.” Seely, PDG team member 
Due to the variation in attitudes toward using IM for work, the manager 
constantly sent email reminders to the whole group stressing the importance of using IM. 
Gradually, being on IM became the accepted behavior standard.  
“Well, Mack had to tell us again and again and again, please use IM. It wasn’t 
easy. Once he pushed us and pushed us, most of us came on IM.” Seely, PDG 
team member 
 When people violated the behavior standard of using IM, they got “punishment” 
for the violation. The same story about one person who refused to use instant messenger 
and later got laid off was repeatedly told by several group members.  
 The adoption process took time, and the other soft rules about how the technology 
should be used were gradually formed during the process of technology adoption. In the  
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case of IM, people first adopted the technology, and then they formed the norm of 
indicating their status on IM, which was a soft but not an explicit rule. Soft rules, which 
are part of the clan control, will be discussed further in section about clan control. PDG 
group member Seely described the process of adopting instant messenger in their group.  
 “In the first two months, we would not even be on IM. The next about three 
months, not all of us login into IM everyday…This is the sixth month…, now all of 
us are on IM. We still do not always show our status. For example, we go off for 
lunch. We don’t change the status in IM. I would say it took us 5 months to 
actually adopt it, and it will take another 2 months to come up with the right 
norms on IM. When do you change status, you log out.” Seely, PDG team member 
 After IM was adopted, it became one of the mechanisms to manage availability of 
the employees, as shown earlier in the availability management section. Mack, the group 
director, started to rely on IM to manage people’s availability.  
“As the day progresses across the country in particular, you know, Seely comes 
on early in the morning, Cadee comes on early in the morning, Sage gets in early 
because he is mountain time, and then Diana, and Belinda, and Chad comes on 
west coast at different time. I know that now they are available. Mack, PDG team 
director 
5.2.3 Clan Control 
 Outcome and behavioral controls are categorized as formal control. Our data also 
shows that informal controls, including clan control and self control, were exercised in 
telework. The primary control mechanisms of clan control included employees’ selection 
and promotion, corporate value internalization, trust building, and work norms.  
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5.2.3.1 Employee Selection and Promotion 
 Selecting and promoting qualified employees were control mechanisms in both 
groups. The managers sought two sets of skills when hiring people. First, the managers 
looked for employees with qualified professional skills. Second, the managers looked for 
employees with qualities that would be suitable to work in telework environment. These 
qualities include being highly self-motivated, being able to work independently, and 
having good communication skills when working virtually.   
 The reasons why the managers looked for people with such qualities was because 
they believed that in telework, it was necessary to minimize day-to-day monitoring and 
supervision. They stressed the employees’ independence during work.  
“I definitely have the right people…they are very independent, which is great. I 
will continue to make sure whoever we bring in this group…have the same level 
of independence.” Mack, PDG team director 
5.2.3.2 Value Internalization 
The second clan control mechanism is to facilitate employees’ value 
internalization, meaning creating an environment so that the employees can understand 
the company culture and the work process. Value internalization was mainly done 
through employee socialization. For example, the WLSG team director asked the new 
members to work in the office when they first joined the team.  
“It was a year and half ago. I brought somebody in from another company. We 
had them working on site for the first few weeks, I made arrangement so the 
members of my team work in that location. (The new members) come in, sit with 
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one member from the team…They spent the first 6 weeks to get oriented, 
indoctrinated.” Kevin, WLSG team director 
After the employees developed some understanding of the organization, then they 
gradually went into telework mode. 
"In our group, the first step is go flex, go flexible, come to the office for a couple 
of days a week, work from home for a couple of days a week, but I don’t have 
anybody join my group and go immediately work from home…You are going to 
go in steps.” Kevin, WLSG team director 
 In this manner, the managers made arrangement to ensure the employees to go 
through the process of value internalization before they went distributed.  
5.2.3.3 Trust and Relationship Building 
The managers stated that it was essential to maintain a higher level of trust in the 
telework environment. The trust was both between managers and employees, and 
between employees and other employees. Managers trusted that their employees would 
work accountably even when out of sight. With a high level of trust, the managers did not 
need to monitor or supervise employees at all times. The managers started out assuming 
that the employees were trustworthy unless the employee violated the trust. 
“If you cannot trust your folks, then you cannot work like this. If you are a 
manager who has to see everybody everyday and that is what makes them work, 
makes them productive. Then you couldn’t be able to work like this and you 
shouldn’t try, because you are going to drive people insane and that include 
yourself” Mack W, PDG team director 
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The employees believed that trust and understanding between peers were also 
important. The content of their work was interdependent, and higher levels of trust and 
good relationships within the group helped them to finish the task more efficiently. 
Because they did not want to damage the trust from the other people, they kept working 
hard to maintain their reputations.  
In this environment, the dominant trust building mechanism was based on 
historical work performance. Because people were distributed and did not meet face-to-
face daily, people trusted other people based on the other person’s record of successful 
completion of tasks on time. 
“Your work becomes your face, because you are not going to meet them, and it 
doesn’t matter how you drive, what you look like. All it matters is how you work.” 
Seely, PDG team member 
The trust based on historical work performance did not come right away when 
new members joined the team. Trust building took time. The new members in a team 
needed to work within the team to establish their reputations and gain the trust from their 
peers. The new employee needed to build up trust with their work output over time. 
“Roan is very new to the group, there is probably less trust there. We are 
distributed, we haven’t seen his output yet. We haven’t seen him work before. 
Kate probably has an easier entry just because we all have worked with her in the 
past.” Matthew, WLSG team member 
 In addition, although the team only met face-to-face occasionally, face-to-face 
group meetings were still powerful trust and relationship-building mechanisms. For 
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example, WLSG team director, Kevin arranged travels for his group members to gather 
the whole team together so that they had occasional face-to-face meetings. 
“To find some way to draw them together to make up for their not bouncing (into) 
each other in the hallways.” Kevin, WLSG team director 
Moreover, communication technologies that enhanced the richness of the 
communication also facilitated relationship building among distributed employees. One 
example was the use of video cameras in PDG team. Employees in PDG team reported 
that the use of video cameras enriched their online interactions. When a camera was used 
in the teleconference, it enriched the communication by adding visual cues. 
“We can facilitate the video conference.…. The expressions people make, when 
certain jokes, certain news comes out, reveals a lot in the meeting. So somebody 
says something about a specific project, and you see somebody frowning, it is 
easy to key in on that person, to say, ’Hey, what is wrong? Is there something 
wrong with the project we are proposing?’ versus, you are just on the phone, it 
would just be a dead silence. You cannot really tell why it is a dead silence.” 
Chad, PDG team member 
 When a video camera was used in one-on-one meetings between the 
employee and the manager, it also brought value. 
“When I have my one-on-one with Mack, it is pretty nice. Basically just seeing 
him, him interacting with me, I feel more like cohesiveness. You know, I work for 
this guy. I work for this company.” Chad, PDG team member 
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5.2.3.4 Soft Rules 
Another form of clan control was soft rules, which evolved in the process of 
work. The distinction between soft rules and protocols was that the protocols were 
specified by the manager, while the work norms were not explicitly specified by the 
manager or other authorities, but were generated by the employees. Employees created 
these soft rules because they made the work more efficient, and gradually these soft rules 
regulated their work and became part of the clan control.  
One example of soft rules was “overlap time”. Since people were distributed in 
different time zones, they found that being available and accessible during the time when 
all the people across time zones work was an efficient way to communicate, therefore the 
“overlap time” became a soft rule.  
“I work with people in Boston and Colorado...We scheduled all of our meeting 
between 11am my time and about 3 o’clock my time, which is our common time. I 
will make sure I am available at that time. Everyone else does that too. We know 
we can pick up the phone and talk to somebody.” Seely, PDG team member  
5.2.4 Self Control 
The fourth form of control is self-control. In these two groups, people primarily 
worked from home and away from their managers. Each person reported that they had 
their own self management strategies to ensure work productivity. 
5.2.4.1 Configuring Work Time 
Some people configured their time to draw boundaries between work and 
personal life. For example, Kate, WLSG team member, reserved peak time for work 
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everyday and clearly defined the boundaries between work and life in order to work 
productively.   
“Typical work day for me is from 7:40 or 8 o’clock in the morning, and I typically 
shut down at 5…. I have a family. I try very hard to stick to the 8-5 time period. 
To get my job done in that time frame, I don’t spend time socializing and 
networking with people because kids come home and then it is difficult to juggle 
anything.” Kate, WLSG team member 
5.2.4.2 Configuring Work Place 
Some people configured their space to draw boundaries between work and 
personal life. For example, Mary, WLSG team member, separated her work and personal 
life space so that she could concentrate on work.  
“I work primarily from SF office in TechCo. I don’t typically work at home 
because I will lose concentration. I am just not very good at working at home, so I 
come to the office everyday” Mary, WLSG team member 
5.2.4.3 Optimally Utilizing Technologies 
 Information technologies, especially the mobile and wireless technologies, 
enabled the employees to work anytime anywhere. Some employees in telework 
optimally utilized these technologies to better use their time. For example, when 
Matthew, WLSG team member, moved to a new apartment and had no immediate 
network access, he used his mobiles to conduct work.  
“This morning, I was doing most of my emails on my phone. One (email on my 
way) from the apartment I’m living in at the moment to a nearby coffee shop.  
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(Then I) had a meeting there, and did a bunch of more work there, you know, 
downloading some files, and now I am actually back at the apartment, talking to 
you on the cell phone and working offline of my laptop, and I will switch 
somewhere to log back in and send a bunch of stuff later, or just connect to my 
phone and send them over my phone that way.” Matthew, WLSG team member 
 The use of mobile technologies also helped the employees to balance their work 
and personal life. Kevin, WLSG team director recalled an occasion that he was able to 
integrate his work and personal life activities. 
“I was in a softball championship last week to be with my daughter. Great thing 
is I can work from the softball field. Because I spent my time on the phone…I 
have a calendar on it, I have a laptop and I keep everything loaded. When I got 
there, I just need to find a spot and kick and go, and take a few phone calls and 
have a discussion with somebody.” Kevin, WLSG team director 
In summary, employees exercised self-control strategies by configuring their 
work time and work space, and utilizing the mobile technologies to ensure their work 
productivities. 
5.2.5 Summary of the Results 
 To summarize, I identified four types of organizational controls in  these two 
teams that I studied. For each type of control, I identified its control mechanisms. Table 2 
shows the control type, control mechanism, and the examples from these two teams.  
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Table 2: Control Mechanisms of Four Forms of Controls in Telework 
Control 
Forms 
Control 
Mechanisms  Definition Illustrated Quotations 
Goal Setting 
Process 
Organizational-level policies about 
goal setting and performance 
evaluation based on goals  
“……I don’t mind if they spend 8 o’clock in the morning to 6 o’clock in 
the night working, or 8 o’clock to 6 o’clock in the zoo, as long as they 
meet their goals and don’t’ miss the deadline.” Kevin, WLSG team 
director 
Deliverable Focus 
The middle-level managers focus on 
specifying deliverables of work and 
monitor the timeliness and quality of 
the deliverables 
“They (the deliverables) can be very simplistic such as the physical 
design standards, or the functional requirements for technologies to 
support open work, they are written documents….” Mack, PDG team 
leader.  
Outcome 
Controls  
Checkpoints 
It refers to the points in time on 
which the employees will provide 
status update of the work. 
Checkpoints can be initiated by both 
the managers or the employees.  
“Since I have been working from home… I’ve started to make sure I 
work proactive in communicating, just to my own boss, what I am 
working on, what is my status, what I am doing. Even if it is good, even 
it is I am on track. If it is due in two weeks, one week has expired, I’ve 
done a week worth. I have one week left. I will tell him that, so he 
knows.” Sage, PDG team member 
Rules and 
Protocols  
Guidelines and procedures about 
how to maintain availability, how to 
use technologies and how to conduct 
work.  
“We try to have some sort of protocols, who can and who cannot 
update something. At the beginning of the project, we are going to 
define, OK. You are someone who is going to update stuff. You are in 
charge of the specific part of the project. So you are in charge of these 
sets of documents.” Chad, PDG team member. 
Availability 
Management 
Mechanisms to ensure the 
employees are available and 
accessible although away from 
company and the managers.  
“We use IM for… presence awareness. It means, OK, I am logging into 
IM and I am on, and I will log in sometimes when I am sick, and I will 
say, ’out sick’. So yeah, people know it, I am still in some level of 
access…” Mack, PDG team leader 
Behavior 
Controls  
Managing the Use 
of Information 
Technologies 
The managers control the 
employees' behaviors about 
adoption and use of information 
technologies.  
“I don’t require them to come to the office, I don’t require them to 
punch a time card, but I do require on any working day, they are on 
their instant messenger. You put ‘I am gonna be on vacation’, or ’I am 
gonna be in a conference’, ’I am traveling.’…”Mack, PDG team 
director 
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Employee 
Selection and 
Promotion 
Selecting and promoting the 
employees that have both 
credentials for the work and 
qualities to work in telework 
environment  
“I definitely have the right people…they are very independent, which is 
great. I will continue to make sure whoever we bring in this 
group…have the same level of independence.” Mack, PDG team 
director 
Value 
Internalization 
The managers facilitate the new 
employees to understand telework 
culture and work process 
“It was a year and half ago. I brought somebody in from another 
company. We had them working on site for the first few weeks, I made 
arrangement so the members of my team work in that location. (The 
new members) come in, sit with one member from the team…They 
spent the first 6 weeks to get oriented, indoctrinated…,” Kevin, WLSG 
team director 
Trust and 
Relationship 
Building 
building trust between the managers 
and the employees, and between 
employees.  
“Roan is very new to the group, there is probably less trust there. We 
are distributed, we haven’t seen his output yet. We haven’t seen him 
work before. Kate probably has an easier entry just because we all 
have worked with her in the past.” Matthew, WLSG team member  
Clan 
Controls  
Work Norms  
implicit soft rules that are created 
during the work process  
“I work with people in Boston and Colorado...We scheduled all of our 
meeting between 11am my time and about 3 o’clock my time, which is 
our common time. I will make sure I am available at that time. 
Everyone else does that too. We know we can pick up the phone and 
talk to somebody.” Seely, PDG team member  
Configuring work 
time 
configure time between work and 
personal life so as to work 
productively  
“Typical work day for me is from 7: 40 or 8 o’clock in the morning, 
and I typically shut down at 5…. I have a family. I try very hard to stick 
to the 8-5 time period. To get my job done in that time frame, I don’t 
spend time socializing and networking with people because kids come 
home and then it is difficult to juggle anything.” Kate, WLSG team 
member 
Configuring work 
place 
configure space between work and 
personal life so as to work 
productively  
“I work primarily from San Francisco office in TechCo. I don’t 
typically work at home because I will lose concentration. I am just not 
very good at working at home, so I come to the office everyday...” 
Mary, WLSG team member 
Self 
Controls  
Optimally using 
information 
technologies 
Use information technologies to 
balance work and personal life 
“I was in softball championship last week to be with my daughter. 
Great thing is I can work from the softball field. Because I spent my 
time on the phone…I have a calendar on it, I have a laptop and I keep 
everything loaded. when I got there, I just need to find a spot kick and 
go, and take a few phone calls and have a discussion with 
somebody…” Kevin, WLSG team director 
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6 Discussion 
6.1 Controls in the Telework Environment 
In my research site, the employees were distributed and worked from home away 
from their managers during the majority of their work time. This situation did not liberate 
them from managerial controls. Instead, my data showed that these employees were 
subject to all four forms of controls (outcome, behavioral, self, and clan control) 
identified in the prior literatures in controls. Each control had its detailed control 
mechanisms and these controls operated together to form a control portfolio in the 
telework environment.  
6.1.1 Outcome Control 
The data showed that the managers exercised outcome controls in telework. I 
identified three outcome control mechanisms, including goal setting process, focus on 
deliverable, and checkpoints. According to prior studies on the contingency conditions to 
apply outcome control, outcome controls are suitable when outcome measurability is high 
(Ouchi 1979; Eisenhardt 1985; Kirsch 1996; Hatch 1997 ). Meanwhile, my data 
identified three concerns about applying outcome controls in our research site: 1) The 
interpersonal interactions could not be captured in outcome control, 2) research work 
involved risks and uncertainties, and 3) the output of the research work could only be 
measured subjectively. Due to the first and third concerns, the outcome measurability was 
not very high in the research site. However, the data showed that the managers still 
applied and stressed the importance of outcome controls despite the low level of outcome 
measurability. This contradicts the expectations of prior theories (Ouchi 1979; Eisenhardt 
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1985) and empirical studies (Kirsch 1996) on contingency conditions for outcome 
control.  
An in-depth analysis of my data revealed that the managers addressed this problem by 
first making efforts to enhance measurability. They established clear and measurable 
goals and focused on tangible deliverables. Moreover, the managers established the 
checkpoints for status updates phase by phase so that the work was recognized even if the 
research work could not make an immediate impact. More importantly, the managers 
concurrently applied other forms of control to address issues that outcome controls alone 
could not address. 
Interestingly, the managers perceived that outcome control was the dominant form of 
control in telework. During the interviews, the managers explicitly answered that they 
“manage by results”. They also perceived that outcome controls could replace behavior 
controls. They made comments about how they did not care how their employee spent 
their day as long as outcomes were delivered. However, they contradicted themselves 
with comments about how they required their employees to stay available through 
technologies.  
6.1.2 Behavioral Control 
The data showed that behavioral controls were exercised in the telework 
environment. The managers stressed that they had rules and protocols to manage the 
employees. The control mechanisms included availability management and the use of 
information technologies. Prior studies on contingency conditions of control forms 
conclude that high level of behavior observability leads to behavior control (Kirsch 
1996), (Kirsch 1996; Hatch 1997; Eisenhardt 1985) because when it is easy to observe 
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behaviors, the cost associated with behavior control is low (Eisenhardt 1985). In 
telework, employees are distributed and managers are remote, making it difficult if not 
impossible to observe employees’ behaviors on a daily basis in the traditional way. 
Therefore, traditional behavior controls are not suitable in this environment.  
The data show that behavior controls did exist but they were distinct from 
traditional behavior controls. The managers no longer focused on monitoring the 
employees’ behaviors in the office-based setting, but rather shifted to monitoring 
employees’ availability through technologies and their behaviors of adopting and using 
technologies in their work. For example, our findings showed that managers used various 
mechanisms to ensure the employees’ availability. Being available through information 
technologies had become the new behavior standard. The data also showed that the 
managers mandated their employees to adopt and use instant messenger and exercised 
punishment when people deviated from the behavior standards. The reasons why the 
managers in telework focus on these new sets of behaviors are twofold. First, in this 
environment people heavily rely on information technologies to work and communicate. 
Second, some aspects of the behaviors about availability and about the adoption and use 
of information technologies can be easily detected. Taking the use of instant messenger 
as an example, the managers could detect whether the employees used instant messenger 
from the managers’ own home.  
The concept of availability management in telework is aligned with the notion of 
“disciplinary power” theorized by Foucault (Foucault 1979). In disciplinary power, 
control is exercised in indirect and subtle ways and people who are controlled experience 
“compulsive visibility”, meaning that at any given time, the people who are being 
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controlled can potentially be “visible” to the people who control, although power is not 
exercised at all times. In telework, thanks to the use of information technologies, 
especially the use of mobile phones and accessline technologies, the employees can be 
expected to be available anytime anywhere. Although the managers do not monitor 
employees’ availability at all times, employees know that they could be monitored at any 
time. Despite the literature on the adverse consequences of disciplinary control (Jackson, 
Gharavi and Klobas 206), our data did not reveal any adverse reactions from the 
employees. 
 Interestingly, the managers perceived behavioral control as a costly way to control 
and frequently said that they did not care about employees’ behaviors as long as outputs 
were produced. Often, they immediately contradicted themselves by stating how they 
cared deeply about employees’ availability and behaviors using technologies. The 
reasons behind the managers’ self-contradictions on behavior controls might be because 
the managers still think of behavior controls in the traditional office-based setting but 
have not realized that managing availability and use of technologies are the new forms of 
behavioral control in the telework environment.  
6.1.3 Clan Control 
My data showed that clan control is part of the control portfolio in the telework 
environment. According to control theories (Ouchi 1980; Hatch 1997), clan control is 
suitable when environments are complex and rapidly changing, uncertainty and 
ambiguity are consequently high, and surveillance is difficult because of limited 
understanding of behavior and outputs. My research site fit this profile of organizational 
environment and task characteristics for clan controls. However, Ouchi’s theory (Ouchi 
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1979; Ouchi 1980) implies that clan control will replace formal behavioral and outcome 
controls. Clan control is considered to be an informal substitute for formal control 
systems (Robey and Sales 1994). Our findings contradict this idea by showing that clan 
control complemented and coexisted with two forms of formal control. I found that the 
managers still applied outcome controls although the environmental and task 
characteristics were imperfect for this type of control because they concurrently applied 
clan control, especially trust, which addressed the limitations of outcome controls.  
I identified four clan control mechanisms including employee selection and 
promotion, value internalization, trust and relationship building, and work norms. These 
control mechanisms are common clan control mechanisms identified or theorized in prior 
control studies (Ouchi 1979; Ouchi 1980). Trust is one of the most important clan control 
mechanisms. I found that the trust building mechanism was primarily based on historical 
work performance in telework. Adler (2001) theorizes that trust in the knowledge 
economy is reflective trust rather than blind trust. Norms play a central role and trust is 
grounded in open dialogue among peers. Reflective trust emphasizes integrity and 
competency. My data showed that people became trustworthy when they demonstrated 
competency, which was shown through their quality work product.  
6.1.4 Self Control 
 Self-control is the other informal control besides clan control. My data showed 
that self control was part of the control portfolio in the telework environment. For 
example, the employees often disciplined themselves to work in a particular place so that 
they could concentrate better on work although they were free to work anytime 
anywhere. These self-control strategies belong to the self-management technique of 
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environmental planning (Manz 1986), referring to changing factors in the environment so 
that positive behaviors are more likely to occur. In this environment, employees are given 
the flexibility to configure their own work time. I found that teleworkers used various 
strategies to configure their time. Some blended work and personal time, while others set 
clear boundaries between work and personal time. The goal was to work productively. 
Thus, time management is an important self-control mechanism. Moreover, mobile 
technologies such as PDA, cell phone, and laptop are important technologies for telework 
employees. I found that the telework employees utilized mobile technologies to make 
better use of their time and balance their work and personal life activities.  
My data showed another type of self-control, employee-initiated control, which 
both relates to and differs from the concept of self control identified in prior literature. 
Employee initiated controls refer to the phenomenon that the employees take initiative to 
report to their managers about their work status although it is not required by the 
managers. Employee-initiated control is similar to traditional self controls in the sense 
that that both of them are initiated by the employees and not imposed by managers. They 
are distinct in the sense that the whole process of traditional self control does not involve 
the manager while employee initiated control involves both the manager and the 
employee. Both of these controls serve the purpose of ensuring that people work 
responsibly. However, the driver of the employee-initiated control is that employees 
desire to gain visibility.  
In my research site, the employees considered it important for their managers to 
understand the value of their work, so they constantly reminded their managers about 
their work status. Although the employees did not conduct self-reporting for the purpose 
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of control, this behavior serves the purpose of control in effect. Because employees take 
initiative to report status with the managers, it increases the frequency of performance 
monitoring, which is an important component in control design (Robey and Sales 1994) 
Interestingly, the actions of the employee, people who are being controlled, actually have 
altered the design of control.  
This situation is similar to the notion of dialectic of control proposed by Giddens 
(1979). Due to human agency, Giddens (1979) theorized that in a relationship of power 
and control, the one being controlled can also affect control. However, Giddens further 
explained agency from the perspective that the ones being controlled have autonomy to 
distance themselves from control. In my study, it is the opposite. The employees being 
controlled take initiative to report, showing that they are subjecting themselves to even 
tighter control. In my data, the employees took initiatives to provide status update reports 
to their managers although they were not asked to do so. These behaviors increased the 
frequency of monitoring, making the employees subject to tighter control.  
6.1.5 Control Portfolio 
 My data showed that all four different controls (outcome, behavior, clan, self 
controls) operated together in the telework environment. Each control form had its own 
control mechanisms, and the four different forms of controls formed a control portfolio. 
The idea of control portfolio has been studied in the context of information systems 
development. Henderson and Lee (1992) conclude that the effects of different controls 
are additive and that the combination of behavior control from management and outcome 
control from team members contributes to better performance. Kirsch and her colleagues 
conducted a series of studies on the issue of control portfolio in the context of 
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information systems development, studying the antecedent conditions that determine the 
form of controls in the control portfolio (Kirsch 1996), how controls are exercised, and 
why the managers structure the portfolio of control modes as they do (Kirsch 1997). 
Other research examines how stakeholders exercise controls during different phases of 
large IS projects (Kohli and Kettinger 2004). These studies are conducted in the context 
of information systems development while my study is in the context of telework. 
Although the study contexts are different, we both found that there exists a control 
portfolio consisting of different types of controls rather than just a single form of control. 
In addition, Kirsch emphasizes the antecedent factors that lead to the particular 
components in the control portfolio.  
 I found that some controls still exist in the control portfolio even under the 
condition that the environmental factors and task characteristics are imperfect for these 
controls. For example, I identified some concerns associated with applying outcome 
controls in my research site. However, my data showed that outcome control still played 
an important role in the work environment. This phenomenon seemingly contradicts the 
prior control theories that specify contingency conditions for specific types of control.  
However, a close examination of the data by regarding the control portfolio as a 
whole can resolve this contradiction. In financial terms, investment portfolios consist of 
multiple investments because the investments within the portfolio complement each 
other. The control portfolio works in the same way. In my data, when the manager stated 
that they “managed by results” (outcome control), they always followed it by saying that 
their employees were readily available through information technologies (behavior 
control), and they highly trusted their employees (clan control). It showed that the 
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managers primarily relied on the outcome control. However, availability management 
ensured that issues that occurred between the outcome check points could be easily 
resolved, and that trust can cover the subjective part of the work that cannot be addressed 
by outcome control. Meanwhile, self control deals with employees’ everyday work. 
Therefore, the four different control forms operate together and complement each other. 
This explains the apparent contradiction that even where antecedent conditions for 
outcome control are not present, this control still operates well in this environment. It is 
because other forms of control within the portfolio complement it.     
Cardinal, Sitkin et al (Cardinal, Sitkin et al. 2004) (2004) studied the dynamics of 
control over time and concluded that the imbalance between formal and informal control 
triggers control change and the balance between formal and informal controls leads to 
organization effectiveness. Although my study is cross-sectional, I observed a control 
portfolio in which formal control and informal control operated together and 
complemented each other. One example is that the employees reported to their managers 
about their work status although it was not required by the managers. Because of self 
reporting, the managers could track the employees’ work output without directly asking 
or monitoring the employees. In this sense, the employee initiated control strengthened 
outcome controls.  
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Figure 1: Control Portfolios for Telework in TechCo. 
6.2 The Role of the Use of Instant Messenger in Organizational Controls 
 The data showed that the employees in telework heavily relied on information 
technologies to work and to communicate. Since using technologies became an important 
part of work practices, the adoption and use of information technologies was highly 
related to managerial controls, especially behavioral control.  
 First, I argue that control over the adoption and use of technologies is a new form 
of behavioral control in telework. Whether the employees adopted particular information 
technologies and how the employees used the technologies after adoption are part of 
work behaviors. The managers can make behavior standards, monitor this behavior, and 
correct the behaviors if there are deviations. For example, the PDG group manager 
clearly mandated the team members to adopt instant messenger. The managers in both 
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LSG and PDG group asked their employees to use, update, and share a public calendar. 
This phenomenon can be categorized as behavioral control.   
 Some people speculate that in telework, the cost of monitoring behaviors of the 
employees is high because of the physical distance between the managers and the 
employees. However, my findings showed that the use of information technologies 
enhances the behavior observability and thus makes it possible to exercise behavior 
controls in a telework work environment. The information about the usage of 
technologies can be easily obtained even in telework. For example, for remote managers, 
it is easy to see from somebody’s email response timeliness or appearance on instant 
messenger, whereas watching somebody work in their home is practically impossible. 
Moreover, when employees use information technologies, they are subject to controls 
embedded in the technologies. For example, public calendar, follow-me-phone, and 
instant messenger were used to make the employees highly available, and the use of such 
technologies was an important mechanism in availability management in TechCo.  
 There are some prior studies in the field of information systems on the controls 
and the use of information technologies. Orlikowski (1991) found that the CASE tool use 
intensified controls on knowledge workers because the employees have to follow the 
work process embedded in the CASE tool. Coombs, Knights et al. (1992) found that after 
the adoption of information systems, physicians became dependent on the computer-
mediated practices and they were more strongly managed by organizational controls. The 
technologies studied in Orlikowski (1991) and Coombs, Knights et al. (1992) are CASE 
tools and medical information systems. These technologies directly aid the work practice. 
They enforce people to work in a certain way with embedded work process. The 
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technologies that I studied, by contrast, are communication technologies, and they do not 
enforce a way of working. My findings agree with the idea that there are controls 
embedded within a particular information technology but my data also showed that 
control over the use of information technologies differs from the control embedded 
within the information technologies.   
 Take the adoption and use of instant messenger in PDG group as an example. The 
data showed a process by which instant messenger became implicated in control. First, 
the manager promoted and enforced the adoption of the technology. The PDG group 
director said that he forced his team members to use instant messenger. He regularly sent 
email messages to remind them to log into the instant messenger, and even punished 
people who refused to do so. This is the control over the use of information technologies. 
The manager’s goal was to eventually use instant messenger to manage people’s 
availability. Second, the employees gradually adopted the technology. In this case, after 
several months, nearly all people who stayed in the group logged into the instant 
messenger everyday. Third, people started to develop norms about using the technology 
in their everyday life. In PDG group, the employees developed a soft rule to indicate their 
status on instant messenger. Fourth, the controls embedded within the technologies made 
the use of information technologies become a control mechanism. In this case, the 
managers use presence awareness as a control mechanism to ensure availability of the 
employees. 
In summary, it is clear that there are two types of controls involved around the use 
of information technologies. The first is the control over employees’ the use, and the 
second is the control embedded in the technologies. (Orlikowski 1991) differentiates two 
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types of controls: personal controls and systemic controls. Personal controls are controls 
exercised from people on people; systemic controls are controls embedded within 
information technologies and thus are not exercised through personal interaction but 
through the adoption and use of these technologies. Of the two types of controls I 
identified in my study, the control over the use of technologies belongs to personal 
control, and the control embedded in the technologies belongs to the systemic control. 
The process illustrated in Figure 2 is a process that transforms the personal controls to 
systemic controls.  
 
Figure 2: The role of the use of information technologies in organizational 
controls 
The controls embedded within CASE tool in Orlikowski’s study and the controls 
embedded within the instant messenger in my study are slightly different. For the CASE 
tool, work processes of IT design are embedded within the technology. When designers 
use the CASE tool, they are forced to follow the embedded work processes. For the 
instant messenger, the IT artifact provides some general features. For example, a sentence 
can be written under the users’ names after the users log into the instant messenger. 
These features of instant messengers restrict and or enable the uses of the technology, but 
they do not constitute work processes. During the process of using the instant messenger 
technology, PDG group gradually formed a soft rule that the team members should write 
down their current status, such as “out for lunch”, or “Dr. appointment 1-3PM”.  The 
members in the PDG group called this rule “presence awareness”, and it was used to 
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control people’s availability. Therefore, the controls were embedded within the instant 
messenger during the use process. The combination of the technological features that the 
IT designers provide and the soft rule that people create embeds the control. I argue that 
the controls are transformed to systemic control because, after the technologies are 
adopted and the rules are formed, the director can control people’s availability through 
their use of the instant messenger without directly and personally interacting with them.    
7 Conclusion 
 I conducted a qualitative study exploring the issue of managerial controls in the 
telework environment. Based on the data collected through qualitative interviews and 
analyzed following the grounded theory methodologies, I developed a theoretical account 
on the issue of managerial controls in the context of telework. I found that rather than 
relying on a particular control form or a dominant subset of control forms, the managers 
in telework applied a portfolio of controls that included all four different controls 
identified in the prior control theories. Each form of control had its own control 
mechanisms, and different forms of controls had complementary effects and formed a 
control portfolio. In addition, I found that controlling how employees adopt and use 
information technologies in their work represents a new form of behavior control that is 
adapted to the telework environment.  
 This study is not without limitations. First, the two teams that participated in the 
study were responsible for supporting the telework environment for their company. The 
nature of their work made them tend to have favorable attitudes toward telework and 
managerial controls within Telework, and thus their views may not be representative of 
all types of teleworkers. However, using these teams in our study served the purpose of 
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revealing the phenomenon being studied clearly, and thus the selection of these two 
teams fulfilled the guideline of theoretical sampling within grounded theory. Second, the 
two teams participating in the study are all stable teams, and my study takes a cross-
sectional design. Managerial controls are very likely to be different in different phases of 
the teams. The dynamics of controls in different phase of the team are not captured within 
the study. Third, we rely on interview data as the primary data source. Observation data 
would be helpful to further enrich the data. However, since the study participants are 
distributed and work in their private space, it is not feasible to obtain observation data.  
 The results of my study have implications for both research and practice. I 
developed a theoretical account about how organizations exercise controls in a telework 
environment and explained the role of using information technologies in organizational 
controls. My first contribution is that we further elaborate control theories for telework 
environment by identifying control mechanisms for different forms of controls. Second, I 
further extend the control theories by redefining behavioral controls in telework. In 
Telework, the managers and the employees are remote from each other, and the managers 
cannot personally or directly monitor the employees’ behaviors. However, they can track 
their use of information technologies in their work. Therefore, controlling the behaviors 
of using technologies is also a form of behavior controls, which have not been identified 
before. Third, I further clarify the difference between controlling how employees use 
information technologies and controls embedded within information technologies. The 
former refers to managerial controls exercised to influence the employees’ behaviors of 
adoption and use of information technologies. The latter means that specific work 
processes are embedded in the design of information technologies, and thus the 
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employees’ behaviors are restricted or controlled when they use these technologies in 
their work practices.  
The results of my study are of great potential value to managers of telework. One 
of the resistance factors of telework comes from the middle-level managers, who believe 
that it is difficult to manage employees who do not work on site. The results of my study 
showed that actually all four different types of control can operate within telework 
environment, and that each type of control has detailed control mechanisms. When the 
managers are informed about the different types of controls operating in the telework 
environment, they will be more confident about their management and have less 
resistance to telework. Second, the managers should understand that it is a portfolio of 
controls that operate together, and that different forms of control may complement each 
other. Managers should choose from the large pool of control mechanisms and assemble 
their own control portfolios that are suitable for their organizations. Third, managers 
should acknowledge the importance of the use of information technologies in telework. 
Managers should shift their mindset about the notion of behavior control. Managing by 
walking around is no longer possible in telework environment, but that does not mean 
that behavior controls cannot operate. Controlling the use of technologies is the new form 
of behavior controls in this new work environment.  
In my research, the employees worked at home for majority of their work time, 
and all group members within the team were teleworkers. For future research, first, it 
would be worthwhile to investigate the difference between controls on full-time 
teleworkers and controls on part-time teleworkers. For example, the difference between 
controls in teams that consist of teleworkers only and controls in teams that consist of 
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both teleworkers and the office-based workers could be investigated. A second research 
avenue would be to conduct longitudinal research to develop a process theory of how 
organizational controls evolve in a distributed team. My data show that "soft rules" 
evolved within teleworking teams, but a more extended study of controls over time 
should reveal a clearer picture of the evolution of the entire control portfolio. Third, 
teleworkers adopt a variety of information technologies such as online collaboration tools 
and wireless devices, and thus more studies are needed to explore the impact of different 
information technologies on organizational controls in the telework environment. 
Hopefully, as telework workforces grow, the results of my research, as well as those 
of future research can update control theory and inform the practitioners to successfully 
manage telework.  
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Appendix 1: The list of the initial codes 
 
Below is the list of codes that were developed based literature review on control theories.  
 
· Technology Use 
o Email Use 
o Instant Messenger Use 
o Mobile Phone Use 
o Video Use 
o Collaboration Technology Use 
· Controls 
o Assumption of controls: The assumption of controls is that people have 
diverse goals and interests. They might be incongruent with organization’s 
goals. Controls are needed to ensure people to work towards 
organization’s goals. 
· Behavioral control 
o Setting behavioral standards 
o Monitor behaviors 
o Performance evaluation based on behaviors 
o Give feedback about behaviors 
o Task observarability: conditions to exercise control. Whether tasks can be 
easily observed 
 
· Outcome control 
o Setting outcome standards 
o Monitor outcomes 
o Performance evaluation based on output 
o Give feedback about output 
o Task measurability 
o Task easy to be associated with individuals or groups 
 
· Agency theory constructs 
o Contract: Principle specify measures and promise rewards to agents in 
contracts to align principle’s and agent’s interests 
o Shirk: Agents act for their own interests when not being observed by 
principals. 
o Interests incongruence: difference between principal’s and agents’ 
interests 
o Delegate: Principals allow agents to act on their behalf. 
o Cost of control: the costs associated with collecting the information 
required to minimize the chance that the agents will shirk 
o Surveillance mechanisms 
o Information systems 
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· Three sources of control 
o Market control: use price competition as a control mechanism 
o Bureaucracy control: rules, procedures, documentations, and 
surveillance as control 
o Clan control: Organizations that implementve clan mechanisms 
facilitate their employees to obtain high internal commitment to the 
firm’s objective, cultures, norms, and values mainly through the 
employee selection, promotion, and socialization processes. 
o Cost of selecting employing 
o Cost of surveillance and monitoring 
 
· Self-control 
o Set up standards by oneself 
o Self Monitor behaviors 
o Self Evaluate 
o Self reward 
o Environmental planning: referring to changing factors in the environment 
so that positive behaviors are more likely to occur 
o Behavioral programming: referring to rewarding or correcting oneself 
based on performance 
§ self-observation: systematic data gathering about one’s own 
behavior in order to establish the basis for self-evaluation 
§ specifying goals: specifying goals publicly can be particularly 
effective 
§ cueing strategies: limiting environmental factors that lead to 
undesirable behavior while increasing those evoking desirable 
behavior 
§ incentive modification: self-reward and self-punishment, and  
§ rehearsal: systematic practice of a desired performance 
§ Self-leadership: recognizes the importance of intrinsic motivations, 
the rewards that result from performing the activities themselves 
 
· Clan control 
o Forming Normas 
o Internalize values 
o Employee Selection 
o Employee Promotion 
o Employee Socialization 
o Trust as control 
o Reflective trust 
 
· Concertive control 
o Consensus of appropriate behaviors 
o Value-based discourse 
o negotiated consensus 
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· Formal controls 
 
· Informal controls 
 
· Disciplinary power 
· Compulsive visibility 
· Power’s invisibility 
· Dialectic of controls: power relations, are always two-way. 
· Employee initiated control 
· Written rules versus rules in reality 
· Control portfolios 
· Control mechanisms  
 
· Strauss & Corbin analysis paradigm 
 
o Conditions 
o Actions/Interactions 
o Consequences 
 
 100
Appendix 2: The list of the final codes used in the data analyses 
 
Context codes 
1. WLSG group 
2. PDG group 
3. long distance work relationships 
4. Telework Support Program 
5. personal background 
6. work contents 
7. Tech. Co. telework culture 
 
Technology use codes 
1. access line use 
1. cell phone use 
2. email use 
3. IM adoption 
4. IM use 
5. mandate use of technology 
6. online calendar use 
7. online collaboration tool use 
8. technology adoption 
9. technology resistance 
10. technology use 
11. laptop use 
12. phone use 
 
 
Control codes 
13. availability management 
14. behavioral control 
15. check points 
16. clan control 
17. Deliverables 
18. desire for face time 
19. employee socialization 
20. employee autonomy 
21. employee initiated control 
22. employee selection 
23. employee work motivations 
24. goal setting 
25. individual flexibility 
26. internalize value 
27. Issues with outcome control 
28. lack of informal encounters 
29. level plain field 
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30. long working hours 
31. management assumption 
32. manager's own experience 
33. motivate employees 
34. nature of the work 
35. the negatives of telework 
36. organizational policy 
37. outcome control 
38. output criterion 
39. peer pressure 
40. performance evaluation 
41. personal skill development 
42. proactive communication 
43. productivity 
44. reasons being remote 
45. relationship building 
46. remote delay 
47. remote management challenge 
48. resistance to telework 
49. rules and protocols 
50. self control 
51. Self motivated 
52. self perceived productivity 
53. social element 
54. strategic check-in 
55. team performance 
56. trust building 
57. uncertainty of the work 
58. video technology use 
59. visibility 
60. work life balance 
61. work norm 
62. work space 
63. work time 
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